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FOREWARD 
Ten years ago, as the Washington College of Law prepared 
for its centennial, Professor Angela Davis and I were among a 
small group who met with Dean Grossman to discuss how, 
within the context of the celebration, to rectify the absence of 
African Americans in the founding and early history of the law 
school.  He listened.  Then he asked what we would like to do.   
Ultimately, we all agreed to hold a day-long conference 
during which we would gather lawyers, legal scholars, judges, 
journalists, and students to examine the state of the relationship 
between the African-American community and the justice sys-
tem.  And that is what we did:  a committed group of faculty and 
staff members organized into a planning committee and 
“brought forth” the African Americans and the Law Conference.  
To our collective surprise and delight, people came to see and 
participate in a great day of discussion, reflection, and celebra-
tion.  Thus, when the Centennial Celebration morphed into the 
annual Founders Celebration, our conference came along.   
Judge Sylvania Woods played a key role in that first confer-
ence as one of a group of judges who talked with us that after-
noon about their individual journeys to the bench and how each 
had triumphed over moments of racism and other obstacles.  
Each narrative was compelling, but we remember Judge Woods 
for his common sense and humor, qualities that had been his 
mainstays along the way.  Later that summer, we learned that he 
had passed away, and we decided to dedicate the conference to 
the memory of a man, a jurist, and an alumnus who had lived an 
honorable life. 
So for the last nine years, the Sylvania Woods Conference 
on African Americans and the Law has occurred each spring as 
the result of the collaborative process that began that very first 
year.  The Planning Committee—many of whom are valued 
original members—puts together a program of experts who 
enlighten our audiences on topics from legal education, to crimi-
nal law, to politics, their nexus with the law, and the ultimate 
impact on the African-American community.  We pay tribute to 
the accomplishments of those who have excelled all along the 
continuum from law school to practice.  And we celebrate our 
having taken our place in the progressive institution that is the 
Washington College of Law.  I am honored to have worked with 
Dean Grossman, the members of the fabulous Planning Commit-
tee, the African-American alumni, the very gracious Woods 
family, and everyone else who has made a resounding success of 
the Woods Conference as we observe its tenth anniversary.   
Finally, I thank The Modern American for dedicating time, 
ink, and space to a special issue focusing on the Woods Confer-
ence.  That this conference and this publication have met in this 
way and time says much for the success of the achievement of 




          Sherry Weaver, Chair 




LeeAnn O’Neill    
    
Managing Editor  Publications Editor 
Chris McChesney  Elizabeth Ann Howard 
 
Senior Marketing Editor  Marketing Editor 
Barbara Zektick  Sarah Haider 
    
Senior Articles Editor  Articles Editors 
Jennifer E. Jones  Tanisha James 
  Emily Nugent 
Faculty Advisors  Megan Romigh 
Professor Anthony E. Varona Diana Santos 
Ms. Sherry Weaver  Alexander Weber 
 
  Staff Writers 
  Tim Harris 
  Eriade Hunter 
  Parag Khandhar 
 
  Junior Staff 
  Chelsy Castro Marlee Miller 
  Cecily Chambliss Daniel Raposa  
  Juan Fernandez-Barquin Chris Stefan 
  Maria Gutierrez Nicole Thompson 
  Shannon Leary Zafar Shah 
 
The Modern American is the Washington College of Law's 
(WCL) non-partisan, student-run publication dedicated to cut-
ting-edge issues in diversity and the law.  The Modern Ameri-
can promotes a provocative, fresh dialogue analyzing Amer-
ica's legal and social systems' treatment of racial, ethnic, sex-
ual, and other underrepresented peoples from a wide range of 
political and social viewpoints.   
Featuring a broad spectrum of stimulating articles by legal 
scholars and practitioners from all over the country, The Mod-
ern American publishes submissions regardless of their politi-
cal sway, social leaning, or limitation to legal issues.  To sub-
scribe to the publication for free, send a "Letter to the Editor," 
or  request  more informat ion,  please emai l 
tma@wcl.american.edu.   
No portion of this publication may be reprinted without the 
express written permission of The Modern American.  The 
views expressed in this publication are those of the writers and 
are not necessarily those of the editors or WCL. 
For more information or to view our issue archives, please visit 
http://wcl.american.edu/modernamerican/ 
 
Copyright The Modern American, 2006. 
 Summer 2006 3 
A PHENOMENAL MAN: 
JUDGE SYLVANIA WOODS 
 
By Pamela Mitchell-Crump, Ed.D* 
J udge Sylvania Webb Woods, more affectionately known as “Uncle Butley,” was truly one of a kind.  He was, and still is, my favorite uncle.  Despite his status as a judge for 
Prince George's County, Maryland, he was one of the most down 
to earth, giving individuals I have ever known.  He always 
helped others in need.  He loved to talk about the law, his hum-
ble beginnings, family, and the importance of education.  I re-
member him offering to pay for me to attend law school when I 
was an undergraduate studying Justice and Law Administration.  
My maternal grandmother, his sister, told me that when my uncle 
was a young teenager, he would sit in front of the fireplace at 
night and talk about the importance of an education.  
One of the most memorable occasions with my uncle was 
back in 1993 when my family and I traveled in a van from Mas-
sachusetts, stopping in Connecticut to pick up my grandmother, 
his only surviving older sister, then on to Maryland to get him to 
travel to Alabama for a family reunion.  Uncle Butley was sur-
prised and very pleased by the spunkiness of the van we drove -- 
an Oldsmobile Silhouette.  He was so pleased that he proceeded 
to take over the wheel and do the majority of the driving.  He 
drove, told many interesting stories, and we frequently stopped 
to get a bite to eat.  Talking and eating were two things my Uncle 
truly enjoyed. 
It was the night of the family reunion banquet.  My uncle, 
Judge Sylvania Woods, was the featured speaker.  The tone, ten-
ure, and skill with which he delivered his presentation were im-
pressive, to say the least, inspirational, and uplifting.  He deliv-
ered a message to which people of all ages and educational levels 
could relate.  His commitment to his work, and true love for and 
desire to help the disenfranchised and underrepresented popula-
tions of society that had no voice, came through loud and clear in 
his message. 
Just being around my uncle was a treat.  He was always full 
of stories, sharing personal experiences, words of wisdom, and 
encouraging me -- as well as hundreds of others -- as evidenced 
by the testimonies given at his going home service, to be true to 
yourself, help others who are less fortunate than yourself, and the 
importance of education. 
During those times when my uncle was ill, my grandmother 
and I would go visit him and he always seemed to be very 
pleased to see us.  He would still do a lot of talking and sharing 
interesting stories or words of wisdom.  In my uncle's last days, I 
shared my deepest thoughts and feelings about him, with him; 
primarily, thanking him for being himself, his unselfish giving of 
himself—heart, mind and money, and the joys of sharing pre-
cious time with him.  He truly was a blessing in my life and the 
lives of many others.  I tried to comfort him with my words 
knowing in my heart that he would soon be going to a much bet-
ter place along with his mother, my great grandmother, and an 
older sister and three older brothers.  He was too weak to re-
spond to my words.  This uncharacteristic phenomenon of my 
uncle not being able to speak made my heart cry.  The deafening 
silence of not hearing his voice was a true sign that the end was 
near.  I often think of my uncle and envision him in all his gran-
deur in Heaven.  This time, however, in a white robe with gold 
trim, still telling stories in God's Kingdom. 
American University Washington College of Law's tribute 
to my uncle, his words, and work through an annual conference 
is truly a wonderful acknowledgement and tribute to a legendary 
man.  A heartfelt thank you goes out to all those who help plan 
and administer the conference each year.  The fact that the con-
ference is in its tenth year is a testament to American Univer-
sity's commitment to the man and his mission.  I thank the Uni-
versity, its conference planners, all conference participants and 
attendees for keeping my uncle, Judge Sylvania Woods' memory 
alive. 
* Dr. Mitchell-Crump is Associate Dean of Academic Fi-
nance and Assistant to the Senior Vice President of Academic 
Affairs at Westfield State College, located in Westfield, Massa-
chusetts.  She has worked in the area of human resource man-
agement for over 21 years and has extensive background in 
equal opportunity, affirmative action, and diversity.     
Dr. Mitchell-Crump received a bachelor of science degree 
in Justice and Law Administration from Western Connecticut 
State University, a masters of public administration in Public 
Law and Management from the University of Hartford and a 
doctorate of education in Higher Education Administration from 
the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.  She has also com-
pleted Harvard University’s Management Development Pro-
gram.   
Her research interests include higher education administra-
tion, institutional diversity, and women of color in the academe.  
Dr. Mitchell-Crump has presented at national conferences and 
published articles relative to African-American women in the 
academe. 
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CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHT—PANEL: 
FROM INMATE TO LEGAL ADVOCATE 
 
Speech by Kemba Smith* 
I t was only a little over five years ago that I was identified as an inmate number.  Today I continue to speak on behalf of those currently incarcerated, those who will be in district 
court on Monday, and those in the future who are being sen-
tenced under federal mandatory drug sentencing.  
Three days before Christmas 2000, President Bill Clinton 
commuted my sentence of twenty-four and a half years for a 
drug conspiracy charge.  If he had not done so, this afternoon, 
instead of talking to you, I would still be sitting in federal prison.  
If my parents had not waged a campaign in the news media, in 
the churches, and among the criminal justice reform community, 
I would not have been freed from prison to raise my eleven-year 
old son.  
I grew up as an only child of professional parents in a Rich-
mond, Virginia suburb, leading an advantaged and sheltered 
childhood.  After graduating from high school in 1989, I left the 
security of my family to continue my education at Hampton Uni-
versity in Hampton, Virginia.  I was not a drug trafficker.  I was 
a college student.  And at the age of 19, away from the protective 
watch of my mother and father, and in an attempt to fit in, I met 
a man while a sophomore in college who I became romantically 
involved with.  Unbeknownst to me at the time, according to the 
Government, he was the head of a $4 million violent crack co-
caine ring.  
He eventually became verbally and physically abusive.  I 
continued to have a relationship with him for over three and a 
half years in which, during this time, he increasingly drew me 
into his drug activities.  The prosecutor stated that I never han-
dled, used, or sold any of the drugs involved in the conspiracy, 
yet I was sentenced as a first-time non-violent drug offender to 
twenty-four and a half years -- one for every year of my life.  I 
remained in prison from the moment I turned myself in Septem-
ber 1994, seven months pregnant with my first child, until Dec 
22, 2000.  My boyfriend at the time did not do any time because 
he was killed.  After he was murdered, the Government came 
after me and held me accountable for the total amount of drugs 
involved in the conspiracy, which was 255 kg of crack cocaine, 
even though according to the Government's investigation, the 
drug dealing started two years before I even met him.  
I did not traffic in drugs, but I knew my boyfriend did.  I 
knew while living with him that he did not have a job and that 
we were living off the proceeds of his drug crimes.  I never 
claimed total innocence and this is why I plead guilty.  The 
prosecutor added extra incentive.  In negotiating a guilty plea, he 
would allow me a bond so that I could go home until sentencing 
to give birth to my son and that I would receive only a two-year 
sentence.  Unfortunately, due to his unethical conduct, after 
pleading guilty, I remained in jail.  Minutes after giving birth in a 
hospital guarded by two prison officials, the U.S. Marshals Ser-
vice walked into my room and ordered that I be shackled to the 
bed.  And two days later my son was taken away.  I was sent 
back to a cold jail cell with my breasts gorging in extreme pain.  
If my parents had not been able to take and raise my son, my 
parental rights would have been terminated.  
Since being released from prison in 2000, I graduated from 
Virginia Union University with a bachelors degree in social 
work, worked at a law firm in Richmond for over four years, and 
bought a home.  I'm currently a first-year law student at Howard.  
I have spoken across the country to youth audiences, inspiring 
them to become educated about the injustices of the U.S. crimi-
nal justice system and hoping that they will realize that there are 
consequences to their life choices.  But most importantly, I am 
raising my only child, who's now eleven years old.  Unfortu-
nately, my burden is that I represent the thousands of others still 
currently incarcerated, some of them my friends that I left be-
hind, that deserve an opportunity to raise their children as well. 
Mandatory minimum sentences are sentences, usually of 
imprisonment, created by legislative bodies that must be imposed 
by courts upon a finding of guilt based upon a fact or some other 
fact not withstanding any other factors that are traditionally rele-
vant to just sentences, including the degree of culpability and the 
accused’s role in the offense.  U.S. law provides that any person 
who is an accessory to a crime or who aids and abets the com-
mission of a crime is a principal and is treated and punished as 
the principal perpetrator in the offense.  In the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1988, Congress applied the mandatory minimum sen-
tences it enacted in 1986 to the crimes of attempt and conspiracy 
in the Control Substances Act.  The consequence is that most 
minor participants in the activities of a drug trafficker are 
charged with all the crimes of the drug trafficker.  This means 
they are facing the equivalent punishment.  The threat of impris-
onment for over 20 or 30 years or more leads many to plead 
guilty and seek a departure below the mandatory minimum sen-
tence.  In 1986, the U.S. Department of Justice insisted on a pro-
vision to the mandatory minimums to permit the Government to 
move the court to sentence below the statutory minimum if the 
government found that the defendant had provided substantial 
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person 
who has committed an offense.  
Many women are unwilling to provide the substantial assis-
tance in order to be loyal to the man they love, even if they're not 
married.  This results in what is called the “Girlfriend Problem.”  
The drug trafficker pleads guilty, cooperates in the prosecution 
of his colleagues and is sentenced below the mandatory mini-
mum.  His girlfriend, having no information about the criminal 
organization other than the acts of the boyfriend, feels morally 
and emotionally compelled not to testify against him.  Therefore, 
she is unable to qualify for the substantial assistance departure 
 and receives the full mandatory minimum sentence -- even 
though, in fact, her culpability is substantially less than that of 
the principal offender.  Aside from mandatory minimum sen-
tencing, various features of drug enforcement in the United 
States have a racially disparate impact.   
The Unites States Housing Act of 1937 was amended by 
Section 5101 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 to permit the 
termination of a lease in a public housing facility if any member 
of the tenant's household or guest of anyone under the tenant's 
control engaged in criminal activity including drug-related 
criminal activity on or near public housing premises while the 
tenant is a tenant in public housing. 
This has been implemented as the 
“One Strike And You're Out” housing 
provision that has resulted in eviction 
of public housing tenants.  This policy 
was recently unanimously upheld by 
the United States Supreme Court in 
Department of Housing and Urban 
Development v. Rucker.  Rucker's 
daughter was found with cocaine and a 
crack pipe three blocks away from her 
apartment, and Rucker was evicted.  
A person with a drug conviction has a lifetime ban from 
food assistance and temporary assistance to needy families.  
Any student convicted of a drug offense shall be denied federal 
higher education financial aid. 
Fortunately, when I came home, I went to back to school to 
complete my degree -- but I was tempted not to even go online 
to fill out the financial aid application because I already had in 
my mind that I wasn't going to have the opportunity to receive 
any based on what I'd heard about the Higher Education Act of 
1998.  But ultimately, I went ahead because I just wanted to see 
what their response was going to be.  How were they going to 
deny me?  What was their language going to be?  Luckily, I did 
receive it, but I believe it was because my conviction came be-
fore this actual act went into place.  
One of the things, especially when I talk to youth audiences 
and people in the community, I try to get them to look at is why 
this provision just target people with a drug offense?  A person 
can commit murder, rape, and incest and still receive financial 
assistance.  And so, it somewhat shows that we're disproportion-
ately impacted within the system, within sentencing and punish-
ment.  But even once a person has done their time and paid their 
debt to society, when they come home to try to make a better 
life for themselves, they are still penalized with education as 
well. 
A non-U.S. citizen convicted of a drug offense or regulation 
must be barred from entry from the United States or deported 
from the United States no matter when the offense took place.  
And I can recall, a young girl I met while I was incarcerated, 
who was eighteen.  She had been in the country ever since she 
was a little girl.  All of her family members had come over to 
this country, and pretty much, she knew because of her drug 
conviction that she was automatically going to be deported.  She 
was somewhat hopeless.  She didn't know who was going to be 
there to support her there resource-wise because she didn't know 
anyone there anymore.  
It is evident that the people who are disproportionately im-
pacted by these federal drug-sentencing laws are people of color.  
And I'm not ashamed to say that I represent those who are cur-
rently incarcerated people just like me, who are capable of being 
productive taxpaying citizens.  When the Congress created the 
mandatory minimum sentences and the collateral consequences 
of the drug offenses, they may not have been acting with intent 
to inflict special punishment on peo-
ple of color, but that has unquestiona-
bly been the effect.  In 2003, Supreme 
Court Justice Kennedy proclaimed 
being against this particular policy in 
a speech at the ABA Annual meeting 
and challenged the organization to 
begin a new dialogue.  Basically, after 
Justice Kennedy made this public an-
nouncement, the ABA formed the 
Justice Kennedy Commission that 
found that since the advent of manda-
tory minimum sentencing policies, the average length of incar-
ceration in the United States has increased three-fold.  They 
found that mandatory minimum sentencing was one of an array 
of policy changes which, in the aggregate, produced steady, dra-
matic and unprecedented increase in the population of the na-
tion's prisons and jails—in spite of a decrease in the number of 
crimes committed in the past several years. 
With mandatory minimum sentences, there are a lot of dis-
astrous social consequences that go along with having an over-
reliance on punitive sentencing policies.  Basically, there are 
excessively severe sentences.  When I speak before people, I try 
to emphasize that it's bigger than just me and my story, that 
there are hundreds and thousands of other Kemba Smiths that 
are still currently incarcerated that have served more time than I 
had, and their kids are going off to college and they haven't had 
the opportunity to be there for them.  Mandatory minimum sen-
tences lead to arbitrary sentences.  They produce the very sen-
tencing disparities that determinate sentencing was intended to 
eliminate.  
Honorable Charles B. Rangle, Congressman, stated that  
No one can justify the 100:1 ratio.  Although 
there are larger numbers of documented white 
crack cocaine users, federal drug enforcement 
and prosecutorial practices have resulted in the 
so-called War on Drugs being centered on inner-
city communities.  This has caused an over-
whelming number of prosecutions and convic-
tions coming from these communities with Afri-
can Americans disproportionately subject to the 
unreasonably harsh crack cocaine penalties.  
Clearly, we're talking about different neighbor-
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“When the Congress created the 
mandatory minimum sentences and 
the collateral consequences of the 
drug offenses, they may not have 
been acting with intent to inflict 
special punishment on people of 
color, but that has unquestionably 
been the effect.” 
 hoods, not different crimes.  Ironically, crack and 
cocaine have the same level of high, so the dif-
ference is merely cosmetic.  Tough on crime 
rhetoric be damned—this discrepancy is stupid 
and inconsistent with a civilized country. 
Every time when I see or hear things like that, coming from 
political members, and I realize the risk they are taking in mak-
ing those particular statements, I just wish that we could have 
more of them.  It's more than likely that political members don't 
want to make statements like that because it will make them 
seem as though they are soft on crime.  Also, with mandatory 
minimum sentences, it undermines judicial discretion, where the 
judge should be the appropriate person to decide on a particular 
sentence within a designated range, not the legislator or sentenc-
ing commission.  As judicial discretion relates to these collateral 
consequences to drug offenses, I don't understand why these 
policies were put into effect because ultimately, if the judge 
wants to impose that as part of sentencing, he's clearly able to do 
that, versus having policy do that automatically.  
There are economic implications, where there's a waste of 
money, as seen in increased expenditures in maintenance and 
healthcare dependent inmates, lost tax revenue from income that 
might have been earned.  There are intangible harms, such as 
emotional, economic and developmental damage to children.  
Disenfranchisement, which is a big issue I'm hoping, in the near 
future, there will be a lot more success.  That's an issue that 
more people are willing to accept as being unfair; that once a 
person has done their time, they should be allowed to be a part 
of the political process, especially because they are taxpaying 
citizens.  With this disenfranchisement, there is consequent po-
litical alienation of our communities of color.  
Another economic factor with mandatory minimum sen-
tencing, and with the increased population in the prisons, is the 
fact that while I was incarcerated in 2000, during the U.S. Cen-
sus, I can remember them locking the entire institution down, 
and they were telling us that they need to give us U.S. Census 
paperwork to fill out.  When they brought us the paper to fill 
out, I wondered, "Why are we being counted as part of the 
prison?"  At the time I was in Danberry, Connecticut, and from 
working with scholars and advocates since I've been home, I've 
been enlightened to the economic factors that surround these 
smaller prison industry communities where they are creating 
jobs and resources by doing the Census and counting us where 
they would offer more funding and resources to that community.  
I believe that those resources should go back to where those 
people eventually end up going back to. 
I guess the fight still continues and I had the opportunity, at 
the beginning of March, to testify at a hearing with the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.  We all came together 
to ask them to determine whether the U.S. Government is violat-
ing international law and norms protected under the American 
Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man by the implementation 
as well as the application of mandatory minimum sentencing in 
a discriminatory manner.  We're saying that in the application of 
these laws in relation to following human rights norms protected 
by the American Declaration, the following things should be 
looked at -- the right to equal protection of the law, the right to a 
fair trial, and the right to due process.  
I'm grateful that you all have this conference in honor of 
Judge Woods.  I was at a conference in Minneapolis at the Uni-
versity of St. Thomas Law School, it's a mostly liberal white 
institution, but it was very interesting that they were dialoguing 
on alternatives to incarceration.  There were three women of 
color that were talking about these particular issues, and then 
directly following, there was a White judge that basically ech-
oed the exact same things we were talking about.  One of the 
things that we all came to the conclusion of was that we need to 
continue nudging the system.  
For me, I question myself as far as why I chose this route.  
But for me, it's a sense of survivor's guilt.  When I do public 
speaking, I want to give myself a little bit more credibility in the 
things I talk about.  But it's a survivor's guilt that I still have 
people who are still there that deserve a second chance just like I 
do.  And I'm grateful for what President Clinton did, but like I 
said, there are just so many others that are still there.   
But when you are put in a position where too much is given, 
too much is required, it can be an overwhelming experience.  
You have this mentality starting off that you want to save the 
world, but I hope we all recognize that we have the fight from 
the past and when I think of our fight from the past, and our an-
cestors, how tough their battle was, it motivates me more and 
makes me want to remain committed and not lose hope—
because their fight was tougher than what we're experiencing 
now.  It's up to us to continue the legacy of our ancestors, and 
despite whether you're going into corporate law, or entertain-
ment law, criminal law, we still need to understand that we have 
a responsibility to our community.  
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* Kemba Smith was a featured panelist at the 10th Annual 
Sylvania Woods Conference for “The African American 
Woman in Law and Legal History: An Important, Individual 
Moment in Law and History.”  This is an edited  transcript of 
her panel presentation. 
Ms. Smith’s case drew support from across the nation and 
the world.  Her story has been featured on Nightline, Court TV, 
and the Early Morning Show, the Washington Post, the New 
York Times, Glamour, People, and Essence.   
As an advocate and public speaker, Ms. Smith has received 
numerous awards and recognitions for her courage and determi-
nation to educate the public about the devastating social, eco-
nomic and political consequences of current drug policies.  Her 
advocacy led to the creation of the Kemba Smith Foundation, a 
501(c)(3) non-profit organization.   
For more information about the Kemba Smith Foundation  
or to contact Ms. Smith, please visit its website at http://
www.kembasmithfoundation.org. 
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CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHT—RISING STAR AWARD: 
COMMENTARY 
 
By Lydia Edwards, J.D.* 
I t means a great deal to receive this year’s Rising Star award.  I am especially honored because the African-American students in the law school, rather than the faculty 
or administration, gave me this award.  The fact that so many of 
my peers think as highly of me as I do of them is humbling.   
Receiving the award on the 10th Anniversary of the Sylvania 
Woods Conference on African Americans and the Law is also 
incredibly humbling.  So many leaders in the African-American 
legal community I have only read about or heard of their great-
ness at the law school before my time attended the conference.  
To all of the amazing speakers, professors, students, judges, and 
lawyers before whom I am honored, I would like to say both 
“thank you” and “I shall try.”  The “thank you” is not just for the 
award, but also for the much easier road that I traveled into law 
school.   
While Sylvania Woods was not there to see that incredibly 
beautiful room filled with brilliant legal minds, civil rights lead-
ers, and the next generation of African-American scholars, I was 
wholly moved.  To all the unnamed people before me, especially 
in the legal field, who paved the way for me to be the first lawyer 
in my family, I thank you.  I thank you for the opportunity to 
exercise my potential.  I am not forgetful that it was only a gen-
eration ago that the room I saw filled with brilliant African-
American legal minds could have represented all of the African-
American lawyers in existence in some states.  To Ms. Weaver, 
especially, I extend a special “thank you.”  She is the surrogate 
mother to so many of us at the law school.  She has been my 
calming force and voice of reason.  She has also encouraged me 
and been there from the very beginning in helping The Modern 
American come into being.  
Because of the support and trailblazing of so many ahead of 
me, I promise “I shall try.”  I shall try to be the best lawyer I can 
be and represent myself in a professional and ethical manner at 
all times.  I shall try to break as many glass ceilings and limita-
tions and bring with me as many people representing the incredi-
ble diversity of the United States as I possibly can.  I shall try to 
fight against injustice.  I promise never to let any person be dis-
respected, denigrated, or abused in my presence without speak-
ing out.  I shall try simply to be a better person, to give back and 
follow the tenants of my religion, to love my neighbor, and treat 
others the way I want to be treated.  I shall try to remember most 
of all to be a flea for justice and keep biting, no matter how 
daunting the amount of injustice.  Enough fleas can bring down 












* At the 10th Annual Sylvania Woods Conference, Lydia 
Edwards received the Rising Star Award.  This prestigious 
award is given to the outstanding African-American graduate at 
the American University Washington College of Law (“WCL”) 
each year who best exemplifies fellowship, congeniality, and 
willingness to help others during his or her tenure at the school.   
Ms. Edwards’ contributions to the WCL community in-
clude, founding The Modern American: A Publication Dedi-
cated to Diversity and the Law, serving the and Finance Chair 
of the Student Bar Association, and serving as a member of the 
Moot Court Honor Society.   
In addition to her studies and many contributions to WCL, 
Ms. Edwards tutored children in Washington, D.C.’s Shaw Dis-
trict, helped protect voters’ rights during the 2004 national elec-
tion, taught constitutional law to public high school students in 
the District of Columbia through the Marshall-Brennan Fellow 
Program, and spearheaded efforts at WCL to help victims of 
Hurricane Katrina by organizing an “Alternative Spring Break” 
trip to Gulfport, Mississippi.   After her first year of law school, 
Ms. Edwards clerked at Henrichsen Siegel, P.L.L.C., where she 
worked on employment discrimination and civil rights cases.  
During her second year of law school, Ms. Edwards clerked at 
the Lawyers’ Committee on Civil Rights Under Law, where she 
worked to ensure local governments and municipalities com-
plied with affirmative action plans.  Finally, the Berkeley Jour-
nal for African American Law and Policy selected her article, 
Protecting the Black Freedmen: Is the Thirteenth Amendment 
the linchpin to securing Civil Rights in Indian Country? for 
publication.  It discusses the civil rights of black members of 
the Cherokee and Seminole tribes.   
Currently, Ms. Edwards is a law clerk for Massachusetts 
Superior Court where she will rotate between civil and criminal 
dockets and four judges.  She will join the Boston office of Hol-
land & Knight, LLP in 2007. 
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CONFERENCE HIGHLIGHT—NORTHSTAR AWARD: 
SPOTLIGHT ON ANGELA DAVIS* 
 
Interview by Professor Jamin Raskin** 
Introductory Message by Professor Cynthia Jones*** 
I t is my honor and pleasure to introduce the Spotlight on my very dear friend and mentor, Professor Angela Davis.  No other person is more deserving of an award or a Spotlight 
for contributions to the African-American community at the 
Washington College of Law (“WCL”) than Angela Davis.  I will 
let others speak in glowing terms about her numerous profes-
sional accomplishments in the criminal justice community as a 
preeminent legal scholar and advocate.  I will restrict my com-
ments to Professor Davis’ unyielding commitment to the success 
of African Americans in the law as aptly illustrated by her steady 
hand in guiding my career.    
I first met Angela Davis in 1989 when she was the Deputy 
Director of the Public Defender Service for the District of Co-
lumbia (“PDS”).  I was in my third year of law school at WCL, 
working as an intern at PDS, and she supervised my internship.  I 
did not work directly with her then, but our paths crossed again 
in 1992 when I applied to be a staff attorney at PDS.  She was 
then the director of PDS and hired me.  She gave me the most 
challenging and rewarding professional experience a young law-
yer could hope to receive.  Eventually, she left PDS, but in 1999, 
our paths crossed again when I applied to be the Director of PDS 
and Angela was a member of the PDS Board of Trustees.  She 
played an instrumental role in my selection as the PDS director.  
Once she became Chair of the Board of Trustees, we worked 
together constantly and our friendship grew exponentially.   
As the director of PDS, I aspired to be the kind and gentle 
director that Angela had been.  She was immensely popular, 
well-loved, and fostered a tight, nurturing community environ-
ment that kept morale high.  She left very big shoes to fill, and 
neither I, nor any subsequent PDS director, was ever quite able 
to establish the kind of relationship with the staff that she en-
joyed.  
In 2002, when I decided to explore teaching law, Angela 
guided me through the process of becoming a visiting professor 
and then being selected as a full-time law professor at WCL.  
Even today, she continues to guide and mentor me.  In fact, I was 
not able to be present at the Sylvania Woods Conference because 
Angela unselfishly declined an invitation to speak at a prominent 
national conference at UCLA.  She encouraged the organizers to 
invite me to participate instead so that I could present my schol-
arship and establish myself among the leading criminal justice 
professors in the country.  I am not sure what I have done to de-
serve such a wonderful and devoted mentor and friend who in-
vests herself so completely and wholeheartedly in my success 
and well being, but I am so very grateful.   
Quite simply, WCL is a better educational institution be-
cause Angela Davis is here.  WCL students are better educated 
about criminal law and procedure, criminal defense, and trial 
advocacy because Angela Davis is here.  Furthermore, the larger 
legal community is better educated about the pervasive problems 
of racism in the criminal justice system and the use and abuse of 
prosecutorial discretion because Angela Davis’ voice is here. 
To borrow the words of the great Chaka Khan, Angela Davis 
is EVERY WOMAN when it comes to advancing the cause of 
African Americans in the law.  Whether it is getting on the phone 
to find a job for a deserving BLSA student or alumna, or hiring 
African-American students as her dean’s fellows, or calling on 
her many friends and colleagues to come to WCL events, or 
moderating panels for BLSA events, or hosting an annual cele-
bration at her home to honor all the African-American graduates 
of WCL, or mentoring aspiring law professors of color all over 
the country to enable them to transition into academia, or hosting 
an event at her home each summer to bring together all of the 
law professors of color in the DC metropolitan area, or simply 
giving sage advice to the other African-American professors at 
WCL, Angela is EVERY WOMAN in this African-American 
legal community because she constantly and energetically works 
to help African Americans succeed in the law. 
So, Angela, (or, “Amani,” as you are known by your closest 
friends), I know you do not feel comfortable receiving an award 
for simply helping black folks succeed in the legal profession.  I 
know you feel that this is just the “right thing to do.”  But not 
everybody does it, and even less do it as well and as often as you 
do.  So, thank you.  If Shirley Chisholm was right when she said:  
“service [to the community] is the rent we pay for room on this 
earth,” you have overpaid what you owe.  With this award and 
this Spotlight, we attempt to give some of that back to you.   
 
The Modern American honors Professor Angela Davis for being chosen as the recipient of the Northstar Award for the 10th 
Anniversary of the Sylvania Woods Conference on African Americans and the Law.  Professor Jamin Raskin recently sat down 
with Professor Angela Davis to discuss her extensive experience with the criminal justice system, activism, and her new book. 
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ACTIVISM IN A MUCH NEEDED AREA 
You’re known for having a very upbeat, optimistic and 
buoyant personality and approach to life.  A lot of people 
who deal with the criminal justice system as liberals get de-
pressed, despondent, and cynical.  So why are you not a cyni-
cal, jaded person after everything you’ve seen? 
I am a little bit discouraged and frustrated about problems 
I’ve seen in the criminal justice system, because I’ve worked 
hard to change some of them and I don’t see those changes tak-
ing place.  For example, around issues that I care about in crimi-
nal justice like the sentencing laws that are so draconian, the 
policies and practices that perpetuate racial disparity in the crimi-
nal justice system are awful, and the Supreme Court’s cases 
really make it impossible to do anything about that.  And there’s 
not a lot of legislation out there dealing with issues like racial 
profiling or selective prosecution, and those are issues that I care 
deeply about.  But I don’t give up hope on those issues, and I 
continue to lobby around and write about those issues, but it is 
discouraging.  I see a little bit of progress being made, especially 
around issues like racial profiling, and I see people making baby 
steps.  I remain hopeful, but I’m not feeling totally optimistic. 
 
What’s your answer to the question all criminal defense 
lawyers get about how you can represent “those” people who 
are doing x, y, and z, knowing that some of them are guilty? 
Oh, depending on who asks me on what day, I give different 
answers. [Laughs]  I have never felt bad for hearing the words 
“not guilty.”  It’s always been a feeling of great joy because I 
feel that the criminal justice system really fails particularly poor 
people so much, that I felt a lot of joy in doing what I did.  But 
the bottom line is you never know.  I have never in my life 
judged a client -- never.  It’s not my role to judge them.  And the 
people I represented, I always said, “There but for the Grace of 
God go I.”  We’re not talking about bad, evil people.  If I lived 
the lives my clients had to live, who knows what I would have 
done, and I can say that to every single person. 
I never thought about whether they did it or not, because 
frankly I didn’t care.  My role there was to make sure I was 
standing beside them, as probably the only person in the system 
who was going to ensure they got respect, were well-represented, 
and who was not going to let the almighty hand of the govern-
ment come down on them and take advantage of them, as often 
happens when people don’t have good representation.  And I 
always felt really, really good about that.  I mean, my personality 
is such that I’ve always been for the underdog. Whoever people 
hate, I just want to help them because I don’t like the idea of 
folks looking down on them and judging them. And I always 
stand up for the underdog.  So it was a good fit for me.  I always 
felt good about it.  
 
GROWING UP IN THE SEGREGATED SOUTH 
Most people who attain a certain level of education and 
social privilege prefer to forget about unpleasant things, like 
arrest, incarceration, prison, rape and abuse. What is it in 
your past that has motivated you to stay focused on some-
thing that you clearly have the luxury of forgetting about if 
you want? 
Well, I’m an African-American woman born in Phenix City, 
Alabama, on the border of Alabama and Georgia near Fort Ben-
ning, in 1956, so it’s kind of hard to forget.  I grew up in segre-
gated Alabama, and I remember separate water fountains and 
public accommodations.  I have very distinct memories of that.  
Traveling from Alabama to my aunt’s house in South Carolina 
with my parents, my father, who was in the Army, used to drive 
all that long distance wearing his formal dress uniform because 
he thought that if he wore that when we traveled, we would be 
able to stop and get gas and food. A police officer arrested me 
when I was nine years old, [chuckles], because I was walking in 
a White neighborhood, and got into an altercation with this 
White kid who didn’t want me and my friends riding our bikes 
on their street, which was a public street. I tell this story in my 
Criminal Procedure Class every year when we talk about arrest.  
So I’ve had life experiences.  
But the bottom line is, it’s not just about my past, it’s about 
everyday being faced with these issues, even now in 2006.  I 
have family members, young, male family members being con-
stantly stopped by the police.  As a middle-class Black woman, 
I’m confronted by issues of race all the time.  I have been fol-
lowed around stores.  I have been in a grocery store—this was 
before I started teaching, when I was at Public Defender Service 
(“PDS”)—I had on a suit that day and was carrying a briefcase.  
And I had a woman come up to me and ask me where the canned 
peas were -- in a way that she clearly thought I worked there.  
And it was kind of like I was invisible as a Black woman.  I 
mean, she sees this Black face, and she immediately assumed I 
was supposed to be waiting on her.  
And that happens to me all the time.  You can talk to most 
Black folks who have come to certain points in their life, where 
they’ve achieved certain things, and they still are confronted 
with race issues. You are constantly reminded about the fact that 
you are Black and somehow people treat you differently, see you 
differently, don’t see you, you’re invisible, or if they see you 
they have certain assumptions.  Those things don’t change be-
cause your socioeconomic or professional status changes.  It’s 
not the same as it was a long time ago. But it’s still there.  
 
But I can see somebody saying that that would make 
them want to distance themselves even more from the under-
class, the people that were caught up in prison. I remember 
my [Harvard Law School] teacher Randall Kennedy wrote 
this article about the politics of respectability.  I took his 
point to be, we have to distance ourselves from the criminal 
underclass and the people who are the objects of police atten-
tion, in order to make clear that our race is not a criminal 
race. 
I’m not sure he meant that, I think he meant, not “distance 
from them” in a sense that you forget about those people and you 
don’t want to be helpful to them, or you don’t want to do any-
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thing to change it.  It’s that you distance yourself in a sense that 
you’re gonna create this different persona so that this idea of 
Blacks as criminal, as bad, as evil, is changed. It’s sort of chang-
ing people’s minds about behavior in a certain way.  I’m not 
sure, I won’t try to interpret Kennedy and what he meant. 
But if your interpretation is correct, I could never do that.  
I’ve wanted to be a lawyer since I was in the sixth grade.  And at 
the time, I thought I wanted to be a civil rights lawyer, whatever 
that meant.  I didn’t really know what that meant.  But given my 
experiences growing up, I knew I wanted to help Black people 
to overcome discrimination and the vestiges of slavery.  I ended 
up becoming a Public Defender, and I still think that was, in a 
way, being a civil rights lawyer.  But, I guess my point is, from 
when I first had aspirations of being a lawyer, I knew that I was 
going to be doing something to help poor people and people of 
color, and I didn’t know exactly how that was going to happen. 
That’s what I’ve always wanted to do.  There’s no way I could 
have done anything else.  
FROM HARVARD TO THE PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE 
TO THE NATIONAL RAINBOW COALITION 
So take us through your experience at Harvard Law 
School? 
My experience at Harvard Law School [1978-1981] was not 
that great.  I had a great experience at Howard [1974-1978].  I 
met my now-husband [a Howard University graduate student 
and assistant Tae Kwon Do teacher, where they met, and were 
married after she finished law school] and had a great four years 
there.   
At the time, there was only one Black professor [at Harvard 
Law] and that was Clyde Ferguson.  Derek Bell was there for 
part of the time, and he was one of my favorite professors. I had 
no other Black professors. I just felt very isolated at Harvard 
because at the time, there was not really much of a focus on 
public interest work. Now, Charles Ogletree is there running the 
Criminal Justice Institute, and there’s a much greater focus on 
public interest work. When I was there, you had to really strug-
gle if you were interested in doing public interest work.  And I 
felt very isolated nervous, scared, and out of my element.  But I 
made it through.  And now I go up there every year to teach trial 
advocacy. It’s different now. 
Being a public defender was truly what I was born to do. I 
loved the whole twelve years I was there, both when I was rep-
resenting clients and when I was running the office.  I just feel 
like it’s probably the most important contribution that I’ve made 
in the world, or will probably ever make.   
The way I ended up going [to the National Rainbow Coali-
tion] was, when I was the director at PDS, I heard that Jesse 
Jackson was starting this new program called “Save Our 
Youth”—a  mentoring program for kids who were in the crimi-
nal justice system.  I heard that he was having these meetings in 
these local churches in DC with prosecutors and judges. As 
usual, the Public Defender Service was left out.  So I just 
crashed one of the meetings. I just showed up and introduced 
myself and said “I heard you were meeting about our clients, 
and I would like to participate.” And the rest is history. You 
know how Rev. Jackson is—“Oh yeah, I want her to work on 
this!” 
At that time I’d been at PDS for 12 years and I was the di-
rector, which was very different from representing actual clients.  
I was doing budget and administrative stuff.  And it also felt 
like, instead of representing just the clients in my individual 
caseload, I was representing every single client in the office. I 
didn’t get the money and the resources, I was letting all the cli-
ents down, and it was getting to be quite stressful.  I’d been 
there for 12 years and I thought, let me try to do something dif-
ferent and affect change in a different way. So I went to the 
Rainbow Coalition and I stayed there for one wild, intense, and 
crazy year. [Laughs] I did some interesting things, and learned a 
lot about politics – a lot that discouraged me and some that en-
couraged me.  
NOT BLIND TO RACISM 
An important part of your career is that you’ve refused 
to be blind to racism and its effects on the criminal justice 
system. But you’ve never defined yourself, in exclusive ways, 
as a “race person,” and you’re a hero to students who are 
Black, Hispanic, White, Asian American, gay, straight.  And 
so, your moral and political beliefs go beyond just fighting 
racism.  Right? 
Yes they do. Very much of what I think about, write about, 
and do is about race, pretty much because that’s been my life 
experience, and that has been what has defined my life experi-
ence.  I haven’t defined myself in that way.  Race and racism 
have defined that for me.  I’ve been accused by people of seeing 
race in everything -- “playing the race card” – whatever  that 
means.  I hate that phrase.  You know, it’s not as if I go around 
looking for race in everything.  But it has been a part of my life 
experience, and I have refused to close my eyes to it  
Having said that, I don’t think that racism is the only issue 
we need to be concerned about.  Issues of class are so important.  
And quite frankly I see those two things as inextricably bound 
together. People of color are disproportionately poor, and the 
poor in this country are disproportionately people of color.  
Even as I talk about issues of race in the criminal justice system, 
I always qualify that to say that it’s often very hard, if not im-
possible, to determine whether it’s issues of class or issues of 
race that account for so many of the disparities and problems in 
the criminal justice system.  I make that clear in my writings, 
and I try to make that clear when I talk to people all the time.   
 
Certainly a lot of students arrive at law school with a 
view that crime has to be looked at in a vacuum, and that a 
person who commits a crime is a criminal—A bad person,  a 
sinful person, or an immoral person. And that it’s wrong to 
inject these larger questions of history, racism, sexism, class, 
into our analysis in criminal law. So how do you engage with 
that perspective? 
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It’s impossible to teach my courses without talking about 
issues of race and class.  I try to teach students what all students 
who’ve studied criminology know, which is the connection be-
tween poverty and crime. And I think most of our students really 
do understand that. I think most of our students understand how 
issues of race play a role as well.  But I think more see the issues 
of class than they do race. And I try to teach that as much as I 
can.  
I’m so glad you raised that, because it reminds me of when I 
was teaching the Bernard Goetz case. Goetz said, “If I had more 
bullets, I would have shot more. I’d been mugged before and I’d 
shoot again” – the whole vigilante mentality.  The case always 
generates a very tense discussion in class.  And it’s interesting 
because I’m always the first one to mention that the four boys 
were Black.  Nobody wants to say it!  And I always go through 
this scenario where the students say “Well they could have been 
four White guys.”  And it makes people uncomfortable but we 
always have an intense discussion.  I always feel as if there’s no 
closure to the discussion and that there’s never enough time in 
the class to talk about it.   
So what I was thinking is that next year I might want to do 
something I’ve tentatively call the “Race Project,” where anyone 
in the WCL community informally gathers once a month in a 
non-classroom setting because that’s always a problem, when 
you have a classroom dynamic with a Black professor, talking 
about race, and students not always feeling comfortable to say 
what they feel for fear of other students judging them.  It would 
be great to have a space where anyone in our community—
students, staff, faculty—can come together to talk about issues 
of race, in a non-threatening environment, to talk through some 
of these issues.  Race is such an important issue, but it’s one of 
the issues that I think most people feel uncomfortable talking 
about in any context, and certainly in the classroom.  It should-
n’t be that way.  So I think we have to try to create space, par-
ticularly as professors, for students to feel comfortable talking 
about those issues no matter what your experience may be.  
EFFECTING  CHANGE—ONE ISSUE AT A TIME 
Tell us about your book. 
I’m very excited about it.  The title I’m currently working 
with is Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecu-
tor.  It’s all about prosecutorial discretion and power—how the 
ordinary everyday exercise of prosecutorial power and discre-
tion, which we as a society tend to accept, what a great influence 
it has on the disparities we see in the criminal justice system.  
And about how prosecutors are unique in our society in that 
they’re the only public officials, in my view, that we really don’t 
hold accountable.  
Our whole system of democracy is about transparency and 
accountability through the democratic process. However, prose-
cutors, who have more power than anyone else in the criminal 
justice system in my view, are the most powerful but the least 
accountable.  Most judges around the country are elected, and 
even those that are appointed go through a cycle and have to be 
reappointed.  Judges can be impeached.  And of course, defense 
attorneys have no power.  Most people would respond by saying 
that prosecutors are accountable because they are elected offi-
cials or appointed through the appointments process.  But what I 
say to them is that the democratic process doesn’t really hold 
prosecutors accountable.  If you ask most people what their 
elected prosecutors do, they will not be able to tell you.  Prose-
cutors run for office, and there is this democratic process, but no 
one knows what they do.  There’s absolutely no transparency in 
prosecutors’ offices so people don’t know what they do.  They 
don’t know anything about prosecutors’ charging powers or plea 
bargaining power or policies.  They don’t even know what those 
things are.  
When prosecutors run for office, they don’t tell people 
about these important responsibilities, but they are the most im-
portant powers prosecutors have, and they have such a funda-
mental impact on people.  Prosecutors make the charging deci-
sion single-handedly, and it’s almost impossible to challenge 
either the charging decision or the failure to charge.  How can 
people hold prosecutors accountable if they don’t know what 
they do and how they exercise their immense power and discre-
tion? 
 
Do you want to retain that power and deploy it for posi-
tive purposes, or do you want to reduce that power and fig-
ure out how to really rein them in? 
Both. I want the power to be reined in, in the sense that I 
want them to be held accountable to the people.  I want the de-
mocratic process and the mechanisms of accountability that are 
there in theory now to actually work in practice.  But in the 
meantime, and if that happens, I want prosecutors to maintain 
discretion.  I think the federal sentencing guidelines proved that 
totally eliminating discretion is a bad idea. At the same time, 
when you have discretion and it’s totally unrestrained, and when 
there’s no accountability for the exercise of that discretion, 
you’re gonna end up with unfairness and discrimination.  Ken-
neth Davis, who writes about discretion in the criminal justice 
system, talks about how the power to have discretion is the 
power to discriminate. So I want the prosecutors to be reined in 
and held accountable, and as they continue to exercise that dis-
cretion, I want them to use that discretion in ways that can fur-
ther justice.  The Supreme Court said “the role of the prosecutor 
is not to seek convictions but to do justice.”  A paraphrased ver-
sion of that quote is actually inscribed over the entrance to the 
Justice Department.  But in fact the reality is that most prosecu-
tors are very political and they’re all about getting convictions 
and running for office..  And it’s fine to fight crime, but they use 
crime in political ways, instead of keeping their eyes on what 
justice is all about. It’s complicated. It’s not an “either or”—it’s 
both.   
THE BEST IS YET TO COME 
Ok, looking forward—you’ve just finished a book, that’s 
a huge accomplishment. Where do you see your research 
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going? Are you going to step outside of the criminal law and 
procedure at any point? 
I don’t see myself stepping out.  I’m actually working on 
another book now, with Michael Tigar, in Foundation Press’ 
Stories series.  It’s called Trial Advocacy Stories.  We’ll include 
essays about famous or significant civil and criminal trials and 
about the trial strategies of the prosecution or plaintiff and the 
defense.  The essays will discuss the trial strategies and signifi-
cant aspects of the advocacy in the trials.  Some will also discuss 
the social or historical significance of the cases.  I also teach 
trial advocacy and a criminal defense course here.  I love teach-
ing students how to be trial lawyers. It’s a wonderful skill, and I 
think so few lawyers have that skill. Trial advocacy is definitely 
something that I want to explore more -- both as a teacher and a 
scholar. But no, I do not see myself stepping outside of criminal 
law or procedure because there is so, so much more to do there.   
There are many other projects I’m working on, but I’ll only 
mention one.  The Vera Institute of Justice, a non-profit institute 
in New York, does significant work to improve the criminal 
justice system.  They now have a project called the “Prosecution 
and Racial Justice Project,” in which they have convinced three 
chief prosecutors across the country—Michael McCann in Mil-
waukee, Wisconsin, Peter Gilchrist in Charlotte, North Carolina, 
and Paul Morrison in Johnson County, Kansas—to allow Vera’s 
staff to come in and gather statistics to try to determine whether 
or not the exercise of discretion in their offices is having a racial 
effect.  I serve on the Project’s Advisory Board.  I am really 
excited about this project because I proposed something similar 
in one of my first law review articles – Prosecution and Race:  













* Professor Angela J. Davis graduated summa cum laude in 
1978 from Howard University with a Bachelor of Arts degree in 
Political Science and continued onto Harvard Law School, 
graduating in 1981.  After graduating from law school, Profes-
sor Davis worked for the Public Defender Service for the Dis-
trict of Columbia.   
As a Staff Attorney in 1982, Professor Davis represented 
indigent defendants in the Criminal Division and juvenile re-
spondents in delinquency proceedings in the Family Division of 
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.  Later, she be-
came Deputy Director and continued as the Executive Director 
of the Public Defender Service from 1991 to 1994.  In this ca-
pacity, Professor Davis represented indigent adults and juve-
niles charged with serious felony offenses in the District of Co-
lumbia.   
Professor Davis’ first teaching appointment was at the Pub-
lic Defender Service Training Program.  Since then, Professor 
Davis has taught at various prestigious institutions including 
Harvard Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, and 
George Washington University Law School.  Her expertise in-
cludes trial advocacy and racism in the criminal justice system.  
Currently, she is a professor of criminal law, criminal proce-
dure, and criminal defense at the Washington College of Law at 
American University.   
During her law career, Professor Davis has continuously 
been recognized for her outstanding achievements.  From 1993 
to 1994, she was a Morris Wasserstein Public Interest Fellow at 
Harvard Law School.  In 1997, the National Council on Crime 
and Delinquency awarded Professor Davis with the New 
American Community Award.  In 2000, the Washington Col-
lege of Law at American University recognized Professor Davis 
as a Pauline Ruyle Moore Scholar for her scholarly contribution 
in the area of public law.  Two years later, American University 
again recognized Professor Davis for her outstanding teaching.  
More recently, Professor Davis was a recognized as a Soros 
Senior Justice Fellow commissioned to write a book on prose-
cutorial discretion and power.  Earlier this year, she was 
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CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED MOTHERS  
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STABILITY 
 
By Professor Nekima Levy-Pounds* 
A s though poor African-American families do not have enough problems to contend with stemming from the lingering effects of slavery, Jim Crow laws, and the 
institutional racism of the last twenty years or so, these families 
have been forced to square off against the U.S. government in 
the so-called “war on drugs.”  In the mid-1980s when lawmakers 
initiated the war on drugs, their purported intent was to catch and 
incarcerate drug kingpins and high-level dealers who were 
thought to be responsible for the increased accessibility of illegal 
drugs in the U.S.1  To accomplish this goal, Congress imple-
mented harsh federal sentencing guidelines and mandatory mini-
mum sentences that called for convicted drug offenders to serve 
lengthy prison terms for involvement in drug-related crimes.2  
Though Congress’ intent in launching the war on drugs was 
laudable, after twenty years and hundreds of billions of dollars 
being spent to fight the war, there has yet to be a marked de-
crease in the flow of illicit drugs in the U.S. 3 
Yet, since the war on drugs began, tens of thousands of first-
time, non-violent offenders, and low-level dealers, including a 
substantial number of women, have been added to the prison 
rolls in nearly every state.4  According to the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics (“BJS”), in 1981, 26% of incarcerated women were 
serving time for involvement in drug-related crimes.5  However, 
recent estimates indicate that over 72% of women serving time 
in U.S. prisons are incarcerated for drug trafficking convictions. 6 
Additionally, while African Americans account for approxi-
mately 13% of the U.S. population, African-American women 
account for nearly 50% of state female prison populations and 
35% of females incarcerated in federal prison.7  Interestingly, 
these women are not kingpins and high-level dealers,8 but are 
often the girlfriends, wives, and relatives of low-level dealers.  
Sadly, they are also, more often than not, the mothers and pri-
mary caregivers of young children.9   
 Women who have been caught and incarcerated for seem-
ingly violating drug-trafficking laws are least likely to have a 
substantial impact on the flow of drug trafficking in the U.S.  
However, astonishingly, these women are likely to serve longer 
sentences than drug kingpins and suppliers due to the unfair ap-
plication of drug conspiracy laws and inordinate levels of prose-
cutorial discretion.10  Under current drug conspiracy laws, a 
woman’s level of involvement and motivation for participating 
in a drug-related crime is irrelevant to prosecutorial discretion in 
bringing charges against her.11  Therefore, in many cases, women 
are more likely to serve a prison sentence that is disproportionate 
to their level of participation in a drug-related activity.  As 95% 
of drug trafficking cases end in guilty pleas due to inequitable 
bargaining power and access to information when dealing with 
prosecutors,12 a woman may admit guilt at the urging of her pub-
lic defender, even if she has never actually sold, manufactured, 
or distributed drugs.  Thus, off to prison she goes.  Then the emi-
nent question becomes: “But where do her children go?” 
WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN                                
WHOSE MOTHERS ARE INCARCERATED 
Nearly two thirds of incarcerated women are mothers of 
young children.  In fact, approximately 200,000 U.S. children, 
under the age of 18, are “parented” by an incarcerated mother.13  
Once a mother has been incarcerated, her children are most often 
left at the mercy of state foster care systems and the courts to 
make temporary and long-term care arrangements.14   This oc-
curs because many of the fathers of these children are often al-
ready incarcerated, another disparate result of the war on drugs 
on poor African-American men.15  The fragile families left be-
hind, overwhelmingly consisting of poor African-American fe-
male-headed-households, are often the last line of defense to 
ensure family preservation in poor African-American communi-
ties.16  Thus, when single mothers are incarcerated, these fragile 
families become dismantled and the futures of their children are 
placed in jeopardy.17   
Incarcerated mother’s children, who range in age from a few 
days old to age eighteen, may be sent to live with relatives, 
placed in foster homes with strangers, or placed in institutional 
settings such as group homes.18  In addition to the trauma these 
children face as a result of being separated from their mothers - 
often their primary and sometimes only caregivers - these chil-
dren face additional emotional and psychological distress stem-
ming from the break-up of their families and placement in for-
eign environments.19  A virtual lack of attention to and dearth of 
research focusing on the impact of maternal incarceration on 
minor children forces these children to navigate state foster care 
systems with little or no access to resources and little control 
over their lives in general.20 
PLACEMENT WITH FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED RELATIVES 
In some instances, when a mother is incarcerated, she may 
be fortunate enough to have parents or other relatives willing to 
provide care for her children.  Although there are benefits to this 
type of arrangement, there are setbacks as well which may war-
rant concern.  Firstly, due to the substantial increase in the num-
ber of single mothers facing incarceration, there has been an un-
precedented increase in the number of elderly grandparents pro-
viding full-time care for their grandchildren.21  A number of 
these grandparents are disabled or have chronic health issues 
such as diabetes or high blood pressure.22  Once grandparents are 
placed in the position of providing full-time care for grandchil-
dren, their existing health conditions may be exacerbated.  More-
over, beyond the natural stresses of child-rearing, grandparents 
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may find the heightened stress of raising teenagers overwhelm-
ing.  Despite such consequences to themselves, elderly grand-
parents opt to provide care for their motherless grandchildren to 
prevent these children from entering state foster care systems.   
As the majority of incarcerated African-American women 
hail from poor families,23 it is also likely that their parents and 
other relatives charged with caring for their children are ex-
tremely poor.  Although these relatives may be struggling to 
provide adequate financial support for their own families, they 
may be tempted to stretch already scarce financial resources to 
help support children whose mothers are incarcerated.  While 
some families do receive foster care subsidies to help meet the 
needs of children in their care, these funds are often insufficient, 
forcing families to fall deeper into poverty and marginaliza-
tion.24   
PLACEMENT IN BROKEN FOSTER CARE SYSTEMS 
If an incarcerated mother has no available relatives that are 
willing and able to care for her children, the children will inevi-
tably be sent to live with strangers through foster care place-
ments.25 These children face a myriad of problems when they 
enter foster care.  For example, these children are likely to suffer 
severe emotional and psychological distress, partly stemming 
from the trauma of being separated from their mothers, and 
partly due to the uncertainty that goes along with being dis-
placed from their homes.26  In addition to the stress, anxiety, and 
fear that accompanies being placed in an unfamiliar environ-
ment, these children may also be separated from their siblings,27 
which can increase their level of emotional distress.  Further, 
these children may experience a form of post traumatic stress 
disorder and may experience perpetual grieving or mourning 
processes, which can manifest as feelings of sadness, anger, 
hurt, and extreme emotional anxiety.28  Not surprisingly, these 
children are likely to use drugs, alcohol, and sexual intimacy as 
coping mechanisms to deal with the stress, grief, and frustration 
resulting from having a parent in prison.29  In addition to every-
thing else, these children may suffer shame, low self-esteem, 
and insecurity because of the stigma of having an incarcerated 
parent and being placed in the foster care system.30 
As every child is different, it is impossible to predict how 
he or she will adapt to life with a parent behind bars.  While 
some children are resilient and seemingly able to adjust to their 
new living arrangements, others are more likely to exhibit vio-
lent behavior and aggression.31  Because most public schools are 
ill-equipped to handle the diverse and multi-faceted needs of 
these children, their cries for attention may go unnoticed or sim-
ply be dismissed as behavioral problems.32  For a variety of rea-
sons, schools may fail to intervene by providing access to appro-
priate services for these children and may suspend or expel stu-
dents who are actually in need of emotional or psychological 
counseling services.33  
As a result, although these children face extraordinary cir-
cumstances in their personal lives, and may preemptively be 
labeled as “problem children.”  Such categorization may lead to 
separation from their classmates or being disciplined for acting 
outside the scope of seemingly normative behaviors during the 
school day.34  At the same time, schools faced with the pressure 
to meet federal testing standards or risk losing precious federal 
funding, may opt to place these children in special education.  
By doing so, schools are consigning these children unintention-
ally to the fast track toward academic failure.  Meanwhile, the 
mental, emotional, and psychological needs of these children 
will likely go unmet.   
Additionally, children in foster care face the likelihood of 
being shuffled from foster home to foster home with little regard 
for the impact that such constant disruption will have on their 
emotional, mental, or physical health.  Although the vast major-
ity of foster parents provide loving, caring homes to children in 
need, there is always the risk that the health, safety, and security 
of children will be jeopardized by placing them in the foster care 
system.35  While foster care was originally envisioned to provide 
safe shelter for displaced children, in some states it has become 
a proverbial breeding ground for sexual and physical abuse of 
foster children. 36   
Notably, a great deal of abuse of foster children occurs at 
the hands of other children in foster care.37  A recent study of a 
group home in Baltimore, Maryland showed that sexual abuse 
for foster children occurred at a rate of more than 28 times the 
rate of sexual abuse in the general population.38  Other studies, 
supporting lawsuits filed on behalf of children abused while in 
foster care, show disturbingly high levels of child-on-child sex-
ual abuse.39  In some instances, the results of these studies have 
lead to civil judgments amounting to tens of millions of dollars, 
against state foster care systems.40 
These studies illustrate the potentially grave consequences 
of separating children from their mothers that may, with appro-
priate social services and financial resources, provide more lov-
ing, caring, and safer homes than state foster care systems.  Fur-
thermore, when one calculates the billions of dollars being spent 
by states to operate foster care systems, coupled with the ex-
pense of lawsuits; it would make more sense from an economic 
and societal perspective to invest American tax dollars in pro-
grams that promote family preservation and upward mobility.  
This alternative seems more prudent than the current practice of 
hastily dismantling fragile families in the name of the war on 
drugs.    
LACK OF PARENT-CHILD CONTACT                             
DURING MATERNAL INCARCERATION 
While a mother is incarcerated, it may be difficult, if not 
impossible, for her to remain connected to her children.  If a 
mother is incarcerated in federal prison, she may be relocated to 
any federal prison in the U.S., without regard for the impact of 
her relocation on her children.41  Since most incarcerated women 
and their children are poor, oftentimes these children are unable 
to afford trips out of state to visit their mothers in prison.42   
Furthermore, even when a mother is serving time in state 
prison, it may be difficult for her children to have ongoing visits 
with her.43  Since the rate of female incarceration is still rela-
 16 THE MODERN AMERICAN 
tively small compared to male rates of incarceration, most states 
have only one or two prisons for women.44  Additionally, many of 
the prisons for women are located in rural parts of a given state, 
making transportation from urban areas difficult for children to 
attain.45  To date, only a handful of programs exist to help ease 
the burden on children of incarcerated mothers by providing ac-
cess to transportation for children wishing to visit their mothers in 
prison.  Due to many of these barriers, the rate of mother/child 
visitation has drastically declined over the years.  Sadly, 54% of 
women in 1999 had never received a single visit from their chil-
dren, as compared with 8% of incarcerated women in 1978.46  
Even when children are fortunate enough to be able to travel 
to prisons to visit their mothers, the trauma caused by actually 
visiting a prison may be too overwhelming for children.  In order 
to visit an incarcerated mother, most prisons have protocols such 
as security checkpoints, physical searches, and the sustained pres-
ence of armed correctional officers which may frighten children 
or cause them to experience psychological distress.47  Beyond 
that, some correctional departments, such as the State of Califor-
nia, have implemented rules prohibiting children over age seven, 
for example, from sitting on their mothers’ laps during visits.48  
At most, children are only able to hug their mothers once upon 
entry and once upon exit.  Such an inane rule, at least as far as 
young children are concerned, can contribute to feelings of emo-
tional detachment and insecurity for children longing for maternal 
affection.49  As a result, children may feel more traumatized and 
overwhelmed once they leave prison than when they arrived.   
Additionally, for some children, even telephone contact with 
their incarcerated mothers is a luxury they cannot afford.  The 
high cost of collect telephone calls from incarcerated mothers 
stretches a poor family’s resources even further.  Sadly, some 
states benefit from the desire of family members to contact rela-
tives by telephone.  The State of California for example, receives 
up to $35 million a year from telephone companies as commis-
sion on collect call services provided between inmates and those 
outside prison walls.50  Thus the exorbitant cost of collect tele-
phone calls often may force poor families to decide between re-
maining in contact with an incarcerated loved one and putting 
food on the table.   
Even when a family is provided with a foster care subsidy, 
the amount of money provided is usually not enough to cover 
transportation expenses and other costs associated with maintain-
ing the parent-child bond during a mother’s incarceration.  Addi-
tionally, when children are placed in a non-relative foster home 
arrangement, the foster parent is under no real obligation to facili-
tate contact between an imprisoned mother and her children. 
Therefore, for many children, this inability to maintain ongoing 
contact with their mothers can often increase their sense of anger 
and frustration about having a mother behind bars. 
For some children, separation from their mothers will end 
once their mothers are released from prison; meanwhile, a grow-
ing number of children will never be reunited legally with their 
mothers.  In 1997, Congress passed the Adoption and Safe Fami-
lies Act (“ASFA”) as a purported  attempt to limit the amount of 
time children spend languishing in state foster care systems.51   
Under ASFA, if a child has been in foster care for 15 of the last 
22 months, the state has the right to terminate a parent’s rights 
and place that child on the fast-track for adoption.52   While some 
states have adhered to the recommended guidelines established 
under ASFA for termination of parental rights, other states have 
adopted even shorter time frames prior to permanently severing a 
parent-child relationship.53  The underlying presumption support-
ing ASFA is that children in foster care  receive a greater benefit 
by being adopted, rather than being reunified with their mothers 
after release.  Thus, ASFA has the unintended effect of creating 
double punishment for incarcerated mothers - the emotional and 
psychological distress caused by physical separation during incar-
ceration and the anguish of becoming legal separated from their 
children.  Unfortunately, it is not clear whether the enactment of 
ASFA alone has reduced “foster care drift,” as approximately 
20% of children age out of foster care, many of whom are unpre-
pared for life outside the foster care system.  
PIPELINE TO PRISON FOR CHILDREN                          
OF INCARCERATED MOTHERS 
The severe emotional and psychological trauma that some 
children face as a result of being separated from their mothers 
may cause these children to behave in ways that virtually guaran-
tees their involvement in the juvenile justice system, and in some 
cases, the adult criminal justice system.  Recent studies confirm 
that children of incarcerated parents are more likely than children 
in the general population to end up behind bars.  As can be ex-
pected, these children often find unconventional ways to deal 
with the pain they face stemming from the break-up of their fami-
lies.  These coping mechanisms may include violence, delin-
quency, and involvement in illicit drug use and drug trafficking.55  
In fact, children of incarcerated parents are also more likely to 
participate in gang-related activities as a means of substituting the 
family they lost “to the system,” arguably paving the way for 
future involvement in the criminal justice system.56   
Though many children of incarcerated mothers are suffering 
internally from the pain of maternal separation, they may also 
experience an emotional desensitization which minimizes their 
ability to feel pain for others.  This indifference to harm is argua-
bly partly to blame for disturbing levels of young male violence 
in inner city communities.  In particular, poor, young African-
American men may be especially susceptible to masking emo-
tional distress due to societal expectations of machismo and bra-
vado. 58  
Unfortunately, law enforcement officers, legislators, nor 
members of the judiciary do an adequate job of assessing these 
underlying causes of juvenile delinquency.  Thus, these children, 
often bereft of adequate access to counsel and maternal input, due 
to parental incarceration, are forced to navigate the juvenile jus-
tice system, and more increasingly the adult criminal justice sys-
tem, without sufficient protection and attendance to their needs.   
In conclusion, given the disproportionate and deleterious 
impacts of the war on drugs on fragile African-American fami-
lies, Congress needs to repeal drug sentencing laws, and commit 
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to a holistic approach to address underlying socio-economic con-
ditions which fuel drug-related involvement.  Instead of continu-
ing to funnel hundreds of billions of dollars into a largely ineffec-
tive war on drugs, Congress should redirect its spending to build 
programs that increase access to quality education for poor chil-
dren, provide comprehensive job training and child care assis-
tance for families in need, and promote family preservation and 
upward mobility for poor families.  Until our government decides 
to loosen its reliance on over-incarceration to address drug-
related crime, we can expect to see tens of thousands more inno-
cent children become casualties of the war on drugs. 
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A CASE FOR REPARATIONS: THE PLIGHT OF THE AFRICAN-
AMERICAN WORLD WAR II VETERAN CONCERNING FEDERAL 
DISCRIMINATORY HOUSING PRACTICES 
 
By LaDavia S. Hatcher * 
I n 1997, thousands of people celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Levittown suburb in Long Island, New York.1  How-ever, the happiness shared by the community who moved 
into Levittown in 1947 was not shared by the over one million 
African-American World War II veterans,2 most of whom were 
systematically locked out of Federal Housing Authority (“FHA”) 
and Veterans Authority (“VA”) funded communities because of 
the color of their skin.3 
Although VA loans made housing assistance available to 
African-American World War II veterans, the federal govern-
ment supported FHA insurance policies that made it nearly im-
possible for VA loans to be insured for African Americans.4  
This practice began with the 1944 enactment of the Servicemen’s 
Readjustment Act5 and continued until President Kennedy’s 
1962 Executive Order that renounced federally funded housing 
with restrictive covenants.6 
By the mid 1970s, 11 million Americans had purchased 
homes through FHA-VA financing.7  Yet, an overwhelmingly 
large percentage of the 11 million homes that were federally-
insured and federally-guaranteed were acquired by, and limited 
to, ownership by White Americans.8  Therefore, as a result of 
racial restrictions, less than 2% of the housing financed and in-
sured with federal mortgage assistance was available to African 
Americans.9  In fact, World War II African-American service-
men still remember the pain caused by federal financed restric-
tive covenants.10  During a 1997 interview commemorating the 
Levittown anniversary, World War II veteran Eugene Burnett 
stated, “The anniversary leaves me cold . . . . [W]hen I hear 
‘Levittown’ what rings in my mind is when the salesman said: 
‘It’s not me, you see, but the owners of this development have 
not as yet decided whether they’re going to sell these homes to 
Negroes.’”11 
This article presents the arguments and substance of a pro-
posed reparations statute to address the federal government’s 
housing discrimination practices, which led to systematic hous-
ing prejudice toward over one million African Americans that 
fought in World War II. 
HISTORY 
The long history of housing discrimination has had a lasting 
effect on African-American communities.12  Housing is the larg-
est component of wealth for most American families.13  How-
ever, African Americans are less likely to be homeowners and 
their homes tend to be less valuable than those of White Ameri-
cans.14  This disparity can be traced back to deliberate govern-
ment policies and programs that predominantly provided home-
ownership for White Americans.15  Although all African Ameri-
cans were prejudicially targeted as unworthy for federal housing 
assistance, this article focuses on the narrow group of African-
American World War II veterans who were statutorily entitled to 
federal financing through the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 
194416, but were denied these entitlements because of their race. 
The Roosevelt administration created the New Deal legisla-
tion, a portion of which sought societal stability by making con-
tinued homeownership a reality.17 The Home Owners Loan Cor-
poration (“HOLC”), the FHA, and the VA implemented this leg-
islation.18  The HOLC, which provided longer term and fully 
amortized mortgages, came into being in the 1930s.19  Thereaf-
ter, the FHA was created.20  However, unlike the HOLC, the 
FHA insured federal mortgage loans instead of making mortgage 
loans.21  Since home loans were now insured by the FHA, lend-
ers were willing to make loans on terms that were acceptable by 
the FHA.22  Then the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 
created the VA, offering federally financed mortgage loans to 
World War II veterans.23  To the dismay of African-American 
servicemen, the administration of VA loans conformed to the 
attitudes and accepted the procedures of the FHA.24  The FHA 
used its biased discretion to decide which loans it would insure.  
As a result, loans in “high-risk” areas, such as urban communi-
ties and inharmonious racial areas, would most likely not be in-
sured.  Thus, in order to make certain that its loans were insured, 
the VA complacently conformed to the FHA’s prejudice. 
 In essence, from its conception, the FHA set itself up as the 
protector of the all-White-American neighborhood by imple-
menting several racially restrictive policies.  One policy focused 
on specific appraisal standards in the FHA Underwriting Manual.  
The manual blatantly instructed that “the presence of inharmoni-
ous racial or nationality groups made a neighborhood’s housing 
undesirable for insurance.”25  Moreover, the underwriting explic-
itly recommended racially restrictive covenants and warned, “[I]f 
a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that proper-
ties should continue to be occupied by the same social and racial 
classes.”26  Thus, although racially restrictive covenants were 
made judicially unenforceable after Shelley v. Kraemer,27  the 
FHA and VA continued to require the covenants.28  In fact, 
Franklin D. Richards, the FHA commissioner during Shelley, 
stated that the court’s action would “in no way affect the pro-
grams of [the FHA].”29 
 In response to advocacy by the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People and Presidential intervention, 
the FHA lifted its ban against integration. In 1949, FHA officials 
announced that the FHA would refuse to issue mortgage insur-
ance on properties bound by racially restrictive covenants re-
corded after February 15, 1950.30   Nevertheless, FHA officials 
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publicly announced that the newly adopted policy in no way 
encouraged open occupancy.31  In a clearly prejudicial effort to 
encourage federally funded housing discrimination, the execu-
tive board of the FHA agreed that “it should be made entirely 
clear that violation [of the new rules] would not invalidate insur-
ance.”32  Consequently, both the Truman and Eisenhower presi-
dential administrations rejected requests to bar FHA aid to any 
segregated housing.33 
 It was not until President Kennedy issued Executive Order 
11,063 that the government considered federal assistance for 
housing that excluded people because of their race, color, or 
creed unfair and against the public policy of the United States.34 
Furthermore, it was only after there seemed to be no hope for 
the World War II-generation minorities seeking federally fi-
nanced homeownership that President Kennedy issued the or-
der.35  Therefore, although the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act 
of 1944 made federally financed home loans exclusively avail-
able to World War II veterans, these loans were not available to 
African-American veterans for at least two and a half decades.  
As a result, a lasting dent was impressed into their wealth port-
folios and overall future advancements. 
 While, federally encouraged racial restrictive covenants did 
appear to end in 1962, the effects of the prejudice live on today 
in the form of lost opportunities, wealth, and property accumula-
tion.  Acclaimed authors Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro 
stated it best when they described the plight of African Ameri-
cans as follows:  
[L]ocked out of the greatest mass-based opportunity 
for wealth accumulation in American history, African 
Americans who desired and were able to afford home 
ownership found themselves consigned to central-city 
communities where their investments were affected by 
the self-fulfilling prophecies of the FHA appraisers: 
cut off from sources of new investment, their homes 
and communities deteriorated and lost value in com-
parison to those homes and communities that FHA 
appraisers deemed desirable.36 
BASIC APPROACH TO THE CONCEPT OF REPARATIONS  
 Before presenting why reparations are owed to African-
American World War II veterans, it is important to place the 
concept of reparations into perspective by breaking it down into 
its essential parts.  Historically, the term “reparations” takes on a 
different definition for different people in different cultures.  
Nevertheless, a constant theme in reparations is the concept of 
human injustice.  In his anthology, The Age of Apology, Roy 
Brooks captures the ideas of many by describing reparations as, 
“responses that seek atonement for the commission of an injus-
tice.”37  Furthermore, Brooks defines human injustice as, “the 
violation or suppression of human rights or fundamental free-
doms recognized by international law.”38  For this article, the 
concept of reparations will be generally defined as a response 
that seeks atonement for the commission of an injustice that is a 
violation or suppression of human rights or fundamental free-
doms recognized by international law. 
 However, before an argument for reparations can be as-
serted, there are five prerequisites for a meritorious reparations 
claim: (1) a human injustice has been committed; (2) the human 
injustice is well documented; (3) the victims are a distinct group 
that is identifiable; (4) the current members of the group con-
tinue to be harmed; (5) and the harm is causally connected to the 
injustice.39  After a meritorious claim is presented, the decision 
as to appropriate redress follows.  Examples of such redress in-
clude apologies, apologies with payment, payment without 
apologies, and the investment of money or services into the 
communities of the harmed groups.40  The events that cause the 
need for reparations are sometimes ignited by racism, power, 
greed, or complacency.  This article argues that reparations con-
tinue to serve as the only concrete way to create mass public 
awareness of previous human injustices to prevent human trage-
dies in the future.    
REPARATIONS PARADIGM 
During recent history, redress for injustice has become a 
phenomenon in both the international and national arenas.  
Apologies, sometimes coupled with monetary and non-monetary 
payments for human injustices, have gained both national and 
international momentum.  Brooks calls it the “Age of Apol-
ogy.”41  Yet, the distinction between an apology with payment 
and simple payment is of paramount importance.  The apologies 
by individuals or entities, even without monetary reparations, 
send a message of atonement, whereas offered and paid repara-
tions without more seem to be settlements.  Apologies send a 
message of acknowledgment and a desire to recognize the past 
in order to change the future.  However, the offered and paid 
reparations without apologies appear to be mere settlements to 
quiet the claimants and relieve the perpetrators of liability. 
Domestically, federal and state governments have offered 
apologies and in some instances granted reparations to prejudi-
cially affected groups.  For example, President Clinton apolo-
gized to Hawaiians for the illegal U.S.-aided overthrow of their 
sovereign nation.  Similarly, the federal government offered 
reparations to the African-American victims of the Tuskegee 
syphilis experiment.42  In addition, the U.S. government apolo-
gized and offered limited reparations for Japanese Latin Ameri-
cans kidnapped from Latin American countries and held hostage 
in U.S. internment camps during World War II.43  It also granted 
statutory reparations to Japanese-American survivors of the 
World War II Japanese internments camps.44  Further still, the 
Florida legislature awarded reparations to survivors of the Rose-
wood Massacre.45 
Specifically, the internment of Japanese in America began 
in 1942 under the direction of President Roosevelt, when he 
issued Executive Order 9066.46  The mission of the order was to 
“prescribe military areas from which any or all people may be 
excluded who might threaten national security by sabotage or 
espionage.”47  As a result, 120,000 people of Japanese ancestry 
from the West Coast were evaluated, relocated, and interned by 
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the U.S. military.  Almost two-thirds or over 77,000 of those 
interned were American-born citizens. 
A Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of 
Civilians (“CWRIC”) was set up by the United States Congress 
to consider redress for the Japanese affected by the internment 
orders.48  It provided five recommendations, which were all en-
acted as the Civil Liberties Act of 1988.49  First, CWRIC recom-
mended creation of a joint congressional resolution acknowledg-
ing and apologizing for the wrongs done in 1942.  Second, it 
recommended a presidential pardon for persons convicted of 
violating the statutes establishing and enforcing evacuation and 
incarceration.  Third, it encouraged Congress to instruct the gov-
ernment to deal with applicants for restitution.  Fourth, CWRIC 
recommended that Congress set aside money for the establish-
ment of a special foundation to sponsor research and public edu-
cational activities.”50  Finally, it recommended that Congress 
grant a one time, tax free, per capita compensation of $20,000 to 
each person that survived incarceration.”51 
Then, in 1995, arising from the legal claims of families and 
survivors of the 1923 Rosewood Massacre, the Florida legisla-
ture passed the Rosewood Compensation Act.52  This legislation 
marked the first time in American history that an American ad-
ministration accepted responsibility for 
an act of racial violence committed 
against African Americans.53  Prior to 
the massacre, the town of Rosewood 
was a prosperous oasis for African 
Americans, despite its geographical 
placement in a predominately White-
American county in Florida. The Mas-
sacre began when White-American 
residents of the county believed that an 
African-American man sexually as-
saulted a White-American woman.  
Local and state law enforcers either 
participated or stood by and idly 
watched White-American residents kill 
African-American men, women, and 
children and burned their small town to the ground.54  As a result 
of the violence, Rosewood was literally wiped off the Florida 
state map. 
Although the Florida government did not apologize for the 
massacre, the state acknowledged its responsibility for failing to 
prevent the tragedy and recognized that White Americans were 
responsible for destroying Rosewood.  In addition, the Act re-
quired a criminal investigation and directed state universities to 
conduct research on the Rosewood incident. Monetary repara-
tions were paid to nine survivors of the horrific tragedy in the 
amount of $150,000; while, the 145 decedents of residents were 
paid between $375 and $22,535 for property damage.55  More-
over, in the form of non-monetary reparations, individual educa-
tional grants under the Rosewood Family Scholarship Fund were 
made available.56  The scholarship gives preference to those stu-
dents that are direct descendents of the Rosewood family.57 
These events mark essential published accounts where 
American governmental entities granted and actually paid mone-
tary reparations.  Drawing specifically from the rationales for 
awarding Japanese interment detainees and Rosewood survivors 
statutory reparations, a foundation should be created for the suc-
cessful implementation of a statute granting monetary compensa-
tion and an apology to African-American World War II veterans 
- standing as a definite and concrete apology with tangible 
weight.58 
DEFEATING GENERAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST             
AFRICAN-AMERICAN CLAIMS TO REPARATIONS 
Critics of African-American reparations employ legalisms to 
support reparation resistance.59  Specifically, African-American 
reparation opponents present five distinct arguments.  First, they 
argue the statute of limitations has run, asserting that slavery 
happened over one hundred years ago.  Next, they argue the ab-
sence of directly harmed individuals because all ex-slaves have 
been dead for at least a generation.  Third, critics point to the 
absence of individual perpetuators, stating that White Americans 
living today have not injured African Americans and should not 
be required to pay for the sins of their slave master forbearers.  
Fourthly, critics use a lack of direct 
causation argument.  This critique 
states that slavery did not cause the 
present ills of African-American com-
munities.  Last is the indeterminacy of 
compensation amounts.  In this argu-
ment, critics claim that it is impossible 
to determine who should get what and 
how much.60 
     All of the mentioned criticisms are 
legally strong.  However, not one can 
defeat the argument for granting repa-
rations to African-American World 
War II veterans.  For instance, both the 
Japanese internment camp and the 
Rosewood Massacre challenges were 
brought decades after the tragedies.  Thus, the statute of limita-
tions did not restrain those successful challenges.  The second 
and third arguments are defeated because perpetuators and 
harmed individuals are identifiable by way of military and gov-
ernment official records.  Furthermore, direct causation exists 
between federally supported FHA racially restrictive policies and 
those veterans who were directly harmed by those policies.  This 
disproves the fourth argument.  Finally, compensation is easily 
calculated by using the increased value of homes financed and 
insured by FHA and VA assistance, which will be paid directly 
to veterans or their surviving spouses. 
FRAMING THE REPARATIONS ARGUMENT FOR THE      
AFRICAN-AMERICAN WORLD WAR II VETERENS 
The following presents a model by which the African-
American World War II veterans’ claim for reparations has an 
“. . . the distinction between an 
apology with payment and simple 
payment is of paramount         
importance.  The apologies by 
individuals or entities, even   
without monetary reparations, 
send a message of atonement, 
whereas offered and paid      
reparations without more seem to 
be settlements.” 
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even higher probability of success.  In  general, the paradigm 
suggests that a claim must be able to identify the victims and 
perpetuators, successfully identify causation, and ascertain dam-
ages that serve as final payment in order to fit in the individual 
rights paradigm.  Furthermore, admittedly, research has revealed 
short-comings associated with general reparations arguments.  
Nevertheless, the Japanese-American and Rosewood survivors’ 
claims succeeded because they fit tightly within the individual 
rights paradigm of the law.  The claim for African-American 
World War II Veterans does so as well.61 
In fact, there are several reasons why the Japanese-
American reparations claim was successful under the individual 
rights paradigm.  First, the Japanese-American internees’ claims 
addressed a specific executive order and ensuing military orders.  
Second, the challenge was based on then-existing constitutional 
norms.  Yet, more importantly, a congressional Commission and 
the courts identified specific facts that proved a violation of 
those norms.  Third, the claimants and the government agents 
were easily identifiable and those governmental agents’ wrong-
ful acts were the direct cause of harm, stemming from the im-
prisonment of innocent people.  Lastly, while the damages were 
uncertain, they were fixed by time and limited to survivors. 
 The claim by African-American World War II veterans also 
fits tightly within the individual rights paradigm, mirroring the 
rationale applied in claims asserted by Japanese Americans.  
First, discriminatory policies of the FHA administration and 
governmental materials62 provide tangible evidence of the dis-
crimination sought to be redressed.  Second, this challenge is 
based on then-existing constitutional norms (the Equal Protec-
tion Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution).  In addition, the court in Shelly v. Kramer found 
that racially restrictive covenants were unenforceable,63 provid-
ing support for the proposition that factual findings prove viola-
tion of those constitutional norms.  Moreover, the government 
agents, FHA Commissioner Franklin D. Richards, the FHA ex-
ecutive board, and the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, 
are all easily identifiable as perpetuators of the wrong.64  In 
short, the perpetuators were directly responsible for the system-
atic denial of federal housing funding and insuring,65 to which 
African-American World War II veterans were entitled vis-à-vis 
the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944.66  This denial re-
sulted in wealth-advancement harm.  Lastly, the damages may 
be uncertain, but they are fixed by time (from the end of World 
War II until the issuance of Executive Order 11,063 in 1962)67 
and limited to African-American veterans of World War II or 
their surviving spouses. 
THE EQUALPROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE             
UNITED STATES CONSTITUION 
 The grant of statutory reparations is a remedy that can retro-
actively cure the effects of unlawful discrimination, whereas 
legislative measures only seek to prevent such conduct in the 
future.  In contrast, Congress has enacted numerous laws to pre-
vent discrimination and its effects.  In theory, claimants could 
use these statutory measures to claim reparations. The Four-
teenth Amendment grants equal protection under the law for all 
persons born or naturalized in the United States.68  By its terms, 
the Equal Protection Clause appears only to restrain state gov-
ernments.69 However, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process guar-
antee, beginning with the 1954 decision in Bolling v. Sharpe,70 
is interpreted as imposing the same restrictions on the federal 
government.71 
Pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause, African-American 
World War II veterans are entitled to a remedy for federally en-
couraged housing discrimination.  The legislature provided for 
the enactment of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 194472 
and the Constitution provides the means by which all men enti-
tled to that right are protected.73  African-American World War 
II veterans were and have always been citizens of the United 
States; thus, they should be afforded protection under its laws.  
The federal government abandoned and traded in its own Con-
stitution to subject its veterans to racially motivated housing 
discrimination.  Accordingly, the U.S. government is constitu-
tionally obligated to right this immoral abandonment of the laws 
of the Constitution by granting them equal protection under the 
law.  Reparations serve as the most effective vehicle to reverse a 
monetary loss of a constitutional right. 
THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 
 Although veterans were without substantial legal recourse 
to fight institutionalized discrimination during and shortly after 
the war, the Civil Rights Act of 196474 provided hope.  Subse-
quently, other legislation sought to continue the purposes set 
forth by the Civil Rights Act, including the Fair Housing Act of 
1968 which prohibited housing discrimination in the lease, sale, 
or rental of housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 
familial status, or national origin.75 
 The Fair Housing Act provides relief for housing discrimi-
nation in the following forms: compensatory damages, civil pen-
alties, punitive damages, injunctions, and attorney’s fees.76  
There are two types of compensatory damages, tangible and 
intangible.77  Some examples of tangible relief include “lost 
wages for time spent searching for alternative housing, the cost 
of temporary housing…and time spent preparing the case and 
attending the hearing.”  With regard to intangible loss, the ma-
jority of its claims are brought under the theory of emotional 
distress.  The two ways to establish a claim of emotional dis-
tress79 due to housing discrimination are by a complainant using 
direct testimony or the fact finder inferring emotional distress 
from the evidence even without medical evidence.80  In fact, 
case law provides a foundation for the proposition that African-
American World War II servicemen have a valid legal claim for 
reparations by asserting emotional distress as an additional fac-
tor for relief.81  Three cases provide precedent demonstrating 
that emotional distress is an intangible loss for which relief can 
be sought in claims of housing discrimination under the Fair 
Housing Act and other civil rights laws.   
 In United States Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
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opment (“HUD”) v. Kogut,82 the court awarded the plaintiff ten-
ant relief for emotional distress as a result of discriminatory evic-
tion due to her sex.83  The tenant was evicted after refusing a 
sexual advance made by the defendant property manager.84  The 
court found that the defendant violated the Fair Housing Act 
when he denied the plaintiff housing and caused her embarrass-
ment and temporary concern for her security.  Both amounted to 
emotional distress.85 
 Similarly, in HUD v. Lashley,86 the court awarded the plain-
tiff and her children compensatory damages for intangible losses 
due to emotional distress.87  The plaintiff and her children were 
continually harassed in their previous neighborhood.88  White 
Americans in the community called them “Niggers” and caused 
the family to fear for their lives by placing a bomb under their 
house containing a flammable liquid and wick.89  As a result of 
the constant threat and torture to their lives, the family was 
forced to move from their suitable community into a less desir-
able community.90  Pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, the court 
ordered the two perpetrators to compensate the family for their 
emotional distress due to housing discrimination (denying a 
dwelling) based on race.91 
 Finally, in HUD v. Sams,92 the court awarded the plaintiff 
compensatory relief for housing discrimination based on familial 
status. The plaintiff family was set to relocate and join the father 
in a new city until their plans were halted by a landlord who de-
cided not to rent to the family because of the number of chil-
dren.93  The plaintiff’s marriage suffered and the children be-
came distressed due to the sudden denial.94  The family was 
awarded $24,000 for emotional distress due to housing discrimi-
nation.95 
 These cases illustrate the types of discrimination against 
protected classes that warrant compensation for intangible harms 
under the Fair Housing Act.  They also provide support for the 
proposition that monetary compensation for emotional distress 
due to housing discrimination is a reality and it should be consid-
ered in this case.  Like the plaintiffs in the above cases, the Afri-
can-American World War II servicemen endured housing dis-
crimination that is prohibited by the Fair Housing Act.   They 
were discriminated against while serving in the military and 
emotionally abused after their service, as a result of being denied 
the right to federal housing assistance.  The government assumed 
that these men were not men at all under the laws of the United 
States.  For these reasons, statistical information providing proof 
of emotional distress may be unavailable, but the veteran’s emo-
tional abuse from discrimination is a reality and should be con-
sidered as an additional factor supporting a grant of reparations.     
RECOMMENDATIONS: COMPENSATING THE VICTIM   
Beginning with compensation, the statute granting repara-
tions to Japanese Americans based payment amounts on personal 
and real property loss and damages.96  Similarly, the basis for 
African-American World War II veterans’ compensation is the 
loss of real property and the damage to the wealth portfolios due 
to exclusion from federal assistance.  Opponents may argue that 
compensation for such a loss is too illusory and hard to calculate.  
However, hard evidence is available to demonstrate the increased 
value of homes that were financed and insured with federal assis-
tance.  For example, White-American homeowners who took 
advantage of FHA and VA assistance saw the value of their 
homes increase dramatically, especially when housing prices 
tripled in the 1970s.97  Thus, those locked out of the housing 
market by FHA racially restrictive covenants and who later 
sought to become first time homebuyers faced an increase in 
housing costs.98 
Calculating compensation for the loss incurred could follow 
a method created by Professor Kathleen Engel known as the 
“Calculating Lost Access to Community Method” or the “CLAC 
Method.”99  This method seeks to approximate the value of liv-
ing in a desirable community versus the value that a complainant 
of housing discrimination has incurred by obtaining housing in a 
less desirous community.100  Using the sales price differentials 
between the two homes in different communities, Engle provides 
an example of how her method would work.  She describes a 
person who sought to purchase a home for $150,000 in a good 
neighborhood versus his alternative, purchasing a home in a less 
desirable neighborhood for $100,000.101  The value of his lost 
access to the community that he originally sought to purchase a 
home in, based on the price differential, would be $50,000.  The 
complainants “opportunity cost is the discounted present value of 
the interest that he could have earned on the $50,000 if he had 
invested it in an income-generating vehicle.”102  The argument 
that not all African-American World War II veterans would have 
invested their opportunity cost fails to consider that the invest-
ment could have been made in intangible assets such as educa-
tion or wealth advancements that would have provided entry into 
aspects of society otherwise unattainable. 
Additionally, Professor Engel offers two other methods of 
calculation.  The first involves establishing the value of a com-
munity based on the difference in the size of a complainant’s 
actual interest payments.103  By applying the housing prices in 
the above example, the first step would be to calculate the dis-
counted present value of the interest the complainant actually 
would have paid on the $50,000. Next would be to compound the 
discounted present value of the interest.  This calculation would 
account for the opportunity cost that arose because the complain-
ant would not be able to invest the money that he would be 
spending on interest. In the end, the total after discounting and 
compounding would reflect the value the complainant placed on 
living in the more desirable community.104  The third method is 
to simply calculate the loss by estimating the appreciated prop-
erty value of homes that were federally financed and insured by 
the FHA and VA between the 1944 enactment of the Servicemen 
Readjustment Act105 and the 1962 Executive Order formally re-
stricting federal support of racially restrictive housing.106 
IDENTIFYING THE VICTIM   
The Japanese-American statute provided eligibility to 
“persons of Japanese ancestry detained, interned, or paroled and 
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subsequently released.”107   Likewise, African-American World 
War II veterans are easily identified as those who served in 
World War II from 1941 to 1945 or their spouse if they are de-
ceased. 
RECOMMENDED REPARATION PAYMENT DURATION 
The Civil Liberties Act of 1988 set the claim and payment 
duration for Japanese Americans in motion.108  Before enact-
ment of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, there was a payment 
duration discrepancy.  This is demonstrated by the fact that the 
original duration was supposed to last only eighteen months 
after July 2, 1948 and the actual first reparation payment in 
1991.109  To avoid such a discrepancy in future reparation pay-
ments, African-American World War II veterans should be al-
lowed to assert claims until all possible recipients are identified 
and notified of their entitlement.  A response from the veteran or 
his spouse should be required to ascertain that notification was 
achieved.  This claim process will curb common mistakes by the 
government and beneficiaries regarding administrative and hu-




The prerequisites for legal success in granting reparations to 
African-American World War II veterans who were discrimi-
nated against by the federal government are present in this case.  
Several conditions are necessary for redress.  First, legislators, 
not judges, must receive demands or claims for redress. Second, 
political pressure must be applied uniformly to the legislature. 
Freedom has no color, therefore all citizens of free America 
must pull together to support this measure.  Finally, the claim 
must present independent legal merit. 
A federally supported statute granting reparations to World 
War II veterans will educate many federally sanctioned discrimi-
nation policies in American history that need not be repeated.  
The American government must acknowledge its liabilities ad-
dressed by this article and take steps to correct the harm caused.  
The substance of this article should prevent future African-
American veterans from reliving the struggle and bitter feelings 
of those African-American World War II veterans locked out of 
governmentally encouraged communities such as Levittown.  
Our society must learn from its transgressions and honor the 
sacrifice of all African-American veterans in an effort to correct 
the past by placing the families of African-American World War 
II veterans in their rightful financial positions. 
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WHERE THE STREETS HAVE MANY NAMES:                       
ZONING, COMMUNITY POWER, AND THE FUTURE OF         
SHAW, WASHINGTON D.C. 
 
By Parag Khandhar* 
 
“Prepare to participate!   
Prepare to participate and your young men (and  
women) will get the jobs rebuilding this community.   
Prepare to participate and the businesses of the  
community will not only serve you but sustain you.   
Prepare to participate and health, welfare  
and municipal services will go up.   
Prepare to participate!”  
 
-Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in a speech delivered in the Shaw 
district of Washington, D.C. on March 12, 1967 
 
“It’s a shame that I survived the war zone era here  
but now I’m being forced out.   
Changes in this neighborhood are for the better  
in terms of quality of life, but I feel I should be able to be in-
cluded in that change.”  
 
-Curtis Mozie, a lifelong Shaw resident who had been  
displaced from his home.1  
 
O nce plagued with violent crime, poor reputations, and decay from neglect and mismanagement, many major cities in the United States have experienced a signifi-
cant face-lift over the past 30 years, with the majority of change 
coming over the past ten to fifteen years.2  Residents and outsid-
ers alike have embraced some of these changes, including more 
comprehensive efforts to rebuild and maintain city infrastructure, 
open public spaces, rehabilitate historic buildings, and transform 
the use of residential and commercial districts.  However, long-
time residents in cities experiencing rapid development have also 
been concerned about the impact of such development upon their 
neighborhoods.  They worry about the future of the neighbor-
hoods they struggled to preserve and improve and are now fight-
ing to stay in due to skyrocketing rents and other cost of living 
expenses associated with increased demand by more affluent 
newcomers.  Longtime residents are also concerned about the 
ease with which the real estate market can erase a neighbor-
hood’s history and transform a once vibrant place into a generic, 
virtual replica of other “renewed” neighborhoods.   
The balance between the old and the new, and the respect 
that city planners and developers observe for the historical and 
emotional character of neighborhoods targeted for renewal initia-
tives are at the core of most conflicts concerning urban develop-
ment.  Municipal governments, private developers, commercial 
interests, and community stakeholders such as residents, locally-
owned businesses, and advocates are all involved in the process 
of deciding what happens to a neighborhood in question, each 
using different tools to push the development towards her own 
vision.   
City zoning and other designations that focus on and stimu-
late economic development are critical tools in this process.  Of-
ten, they are considered to be at odds with community stake-
holders who engage in inclusive, participatory planning proc-
esses that emphasize community development and increasingly 
“equitable development.”  The theory of equitable development 
expands upon traditional community development definitions, 
adding principles of economic justice and job development for 
community members, to the development of physical structures, 
businesses, and buildings. 
What is the ultimate impact of the new wave of development 
that is sweeping through many of the old neighborhoods in cities 
throughout the United States?  Can private and public stake-
holders develop and revitalize old neighborhoods without erasing 
their histories, or upsetting the balance of local residents and 
businesses with too great an influx of gentrification3 agents, like 
wealthy new residents and chain stores, that threaten the very 
character of the place itself?  Will the fast-paced real estate mar-
ket have the patience or interest in development that prevents the 
uprooting of communities that embraced their streets long before 
they became marketable?  
This article will explore some of these questions as they 
relate to Shaw, an historic African-American neighborhood in 
the District of Columbia that is undergoing a rapid metamorpho-
sis fueled by real estate speculation and historical preservation 
initiatives.  This article will examine how different interests use 
zoning, land use regulation, and public perception to affect (or 
deflect) attempts to redevelop urban neighborhoods that are often 
occupied by low-income communities of color.  Using the Shaw 
neighborhood in Washington, D.C. as an example, it will explore 
the ability of community groups to stave unchecked development 
driven by commercial interests, and to imagine and advocate 
their own vision for their communities. 
            SHAW, WASHINGTON, D.C. 
Washington, D.C. occupies a particular constitutional and 
jurisdictional limbo in which its local government cannot act 
without the approval of the United States Congress, in which it 
has no true representation.4   While it is a popular tourist destina-
tion for visitors from around the world, its own history and resi-
dents are not widely known.  With a sizzling real estate market in 
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recent years,5 D.C. is filled with old and embattled neighbor-
hoods that have changed dramatically as the city has evolved.  
The D.C. region of Shaw is a crossroads.  The Shaw area 
stretches between Florida Avenue and M Street on the North and 
South, and North Capitol Street and 7th Street to the East and 
West6  respectively.  What is now recognized as Shaw, encom-
passes a number of historic neighborhoods, including the Greater 
U Street area, Logan Circle, and Bates Street.7   A metropolitan 
“city within a city,” Shaw’s transition over the decades have 
been unpredictable.8  Shaw’s legacy as an historic African-
American neighborhood stems from the creation of a majority 
African-American district through the dual impact of “White 
flight” from Shaw at the turn of the 20th century and restrictive 
housing covenants9 that disallowed African-American homeown-
ers and renters from occupying property in much of D.C.  During 
the heyday of the Black Renaissance, from the 1920s through the 
1940s, when Duke Ellington, Langston Hughes, and countless 
others lived and found their inspiration in the neighborhood, 
Shaw was a self-sustained center for African-American life and 
culture, featuring buildings designed by African-American archi-
tects and more than 300 locally-owned businesses.10    
However, after housing restrictions were lifted and segrega-
tion policies abolished in D.C., Shaw underwent a gradual eco-
nomic and cultural decline.  The downturn precipitated from the 
movement of middle-class African-American families into the 
newly accessible suburbs, and the closing of African-American 
owned businesses that could not compete once integration de-
creased their customer base.11   Riots that decimated U Street and 
destroyed many of the neighborhood’s businesses immediately 
after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in April 
1968 punctuated this period, and delayed further development in 
the area for nearly two decades. 
In recent years, Shaw has enjoyed another “renaissance,” 
with unique independent and immigrant-owned small businesses 
gradually opening along the U Street corridor, new art spaces 
and galleries, and community groups and government agencies 
working to rehabilitate and make affordable housing units avail-
able.  With the opening of a large convention center to the south, 
and the recent addition of a Shaw/U Street station on the local 
subway system, Shaw has suddenly become one of the most 
sought after neighborhoods for developers in D.C.  A number of 
premium condominium buildings have already been built in the 
area, and more are planned. 
Dubbed the “U-Street Corridor,” the main strip of new activ-
ity remains around the intersection of 14th and U Streets, just 
minutes away from a number of African-American Heritage 
Trail stops.  The Heritage Trail makes note of the history of 
“Black Broadway”12  and such landmarks as the Lincoln Theater 
and the African-American Civil War Memorial and Museum.  
The rejuvenated area includes an assortment of new sit-down 
restaurants and a number of eclectic and independent businesses 
selling everything from modern furniture to stationary and other 
goods.13  Additionally, the area is quickly becoming a visual arts 
destination point for non-Shaw residents, featuring many small 
galleries that are almost hidden amidst the mixed storefronts and 
residences.  As a result of many of these changes, the street life 
around the main U Street Corridor has steadily increased, both in 
volume and diversity.14  However, while the initial developments 
suggested positive change and rebirth for the neighborhood, 
longtime local residents and advocates have been wary. They 
fear that the new establishments, renewed attention in local me-
dia, and even the demographic composition of the businesses’ 
new patrons -  the majority of who are White and more affluent 
than the majority African-American residents – herald a new era 
of displacement for longtime residents. 
While development and diversity have been welcomed as 
indicators that the neighborhood is once again becoming eco-
nomically viable, questions still remain about the long-term im-
plications of the growth.  While appreciating many of the quality 
of life changes that accompany urban development, longtime 
community residents and activists are worried that the character 
of the neighborhood will be lost, and that the face of Shaw may 
be changing forever.15 Shaw has been losing its African-
American residents, while gaining residents with much higher 
incomes and who are predominantly White American.16  One 
resident wonders poignantly what he would see if he drove 
through Shaw in five to ten years:  “Would only Whites come 
out of those front doors?”17  
This quote underscores the sentiment of many African-
American residents who worry private developers and other in-
terests would rather memorialize the historic African-American 
community than work to develop the neighborhood responsibly 
to preserve the current community that lives there.  Unresponsive 
development can cause irreparable harm by displacing residents 
with deep roots in the neighborhood.  While the recent changes 
in Shaw, bringing life and new commerce back to D.C.’s  streets, 
seem positive at first, these changes are also raising property 
values and rents.  As a result, longtime residents in low-income 
jobs or with fixed incomes are fearful that they will be unable to 
stay in the neighborhood.  As they move out, property owners 
anxious to reap the benefits of the development are renting their 
apartments out at much higher rates, or converting and selling 
them at market price, both of which slowly change the composi-
tion of the neighborhood.  If this process continues unchecked, 
the vital core of Shaw – its people – will no longer remain in the 
neighborhood. 
ZONING, LAND USE, AND LOW-INCOME                        
COMMUNITIES  OF COLOR 
Shaw’s experience with urban redevelopment is not a unique 
phenomenon in major American cities.  Traditionally, municipal 
governments, as well as private developers, used laws regarding 
zoning, eminent domain, and public land use to control and man-
age the composition of designated areas, at times dramatically 
changing the character of neighborhoods forever.18   Municipali-
ties also use various designations to revitalize or preserve 
neighborhoods.  The United States Supreme Court declared zon-
ing to be a constitutional practice for local governments in 
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1916.19   Since that time, city zoning has often been used to 
make wholesale changes to large swathes of city land.  While 
the American and European “urban renewal” movement of the 
1940s through 1970s sought to elevate cities from their run-
down conditions, many of its architects had little regard for the 
existing neighborhoods, no matter how vibrant.  As a result, 
“urban renewal” was sometimes called “urban removal” because 
of the ultimate displacement of low-income and minority resi-
dents from the communities undergoing “renewal.”  While this 
period was responsible for a number of beautiful buildings and 
many new roadways, it was also the era that wiped out many 
good neighborhoods in cities across the United States.  
“Urban renewal” today is often referred to as “community 
development.”  Unlike the earlier movement, community devel-
opment tries to integrate renovation and renewal of existing 
neighborhoods with the new development.  Planners and com-
munity developers solicit community perspectives and input, 
and strive to simultaneously preserve the historical character of 
older neighborhoods while promoting new development.  How-
ever, even good intentions can be subverted by other circum-
stances, including an open-market economy that tilts the power 
to control land use decidedly in the developers’ favor.  In some 
people’s eyes, while the new wave of urban development is not 
brazenly plowing through communities, it is pushing out disad-
vantaged renters as wealthier residents and businesses begin to 
move in through the process of gentrification.20  
Gentrification carries different connotations for different 
people.  Generally, the conditions necessary for gentrification 
include when run-down or neglected neighborhoods become 
attractive to middle-class and affluent outsiders because of the 
solid housing stock, proximity to the center of the city, and rela-
tively inexpensive rents and purchase prices.20   In addition, real 
estate agents and local media have a role in promoting the po-
tential of these neighborhoods as reasonable alternatives to over-
priced and overexposed popular areas in the city.  As the new 
residents gradually move into the neighborhood, the impact 
upon current residents is not always immediate.  However, even-
tually, while city services (like police presence and garbage 
pick-up) improve, rents also begin to escalate and longtime resi-
dents are often forced to move.  Many factors converge to keep 
individuals from working together to resist unresponsive devel-
opment and preserve their communities, including political dis-
enfranchisement, estrangement or unfamiliarity with legal rights 
and processes, the challenges of survival with limited income, 
complicated immigration and familial status, and language barri-
ers.  As a result of these barriers, disadvantaged communities 
with limited access to power, including those comprised of ra-
cial and ethnic minorities and working class residents, may have 
the most at stake in planning initiatives and renewal programs 
that affect their neighborhoods, yet the hardest time making 
their voices heard. 
 
 
UNCHECKED DEVELOPMENT: D.C. CHINATOWN 
There are many examples of low-income neighborhoods 
that have been lost or destroyed in the process of urban renewal 
and unresponsive community development.  One of the most 
poignant local examples of a neighborhood effectively lost to 
gentrification is the case of D.C.’s Chinatown.  In the recent 
past, D.C.’s Chinatown was a lively, boisterous hub for the re-
gion’s growing Chinese American population.  Now, Chinatown 
is home to less than 700 Chinese residents (100 less than it had 
in 1930) and the population continues to dwindle.22   While the 
buildings maintain some of the Asian flourishes added by com-
mercial tenants and owners over the years, the residents have 
largely moved away, and businesses held within families for 
generations are closing down one by one.23   The neighborhood 
is now overrun by national retail chain stores like Starbucks, 
TGIF, Anne Taylor, and Hooters.24   While the physical preser-
vation of select characteristics of the D.C.’s Chinatown, such as 
the 90-foot tall “Friendship Arch” and the translation of signs, 
regardless of function or audience, into written Chinese, is pro-
vided for in the city code, buildings alone do not make up a 
neighborhood.25   
While a thorough analysis of what has happened to D.C.’s 
Chinatown has not yet been completed, it is not difficult to 
imagine the impact of the new development in the immediate 
area, from the convention center in the 1970s to the MCI (now 
Verizon) Sports Center and shopping and retail areas near the 
Metro Station.  The development likely renewed strong interest 
in the area by outsiders seeking a neighborhood with amenities 
and proximity to the principal corridors in the City, including 
downtown and Capitol Hill.  While the D.C. area Chinese-
American population has grown significantly in the past ten 
years, much of the growth has occurred outside of D.C. – where 
the small resident population of Chinese Americans in China-
town is still getting smaller.  With the general decline of com-
munity businesses and venues for cultural commerce like restau-
rants and grocers, Chinese Americans in the area have fewer 
reasons to go into Chinatown.26   The prospect of living in Chi-
natown after the development was best summed up by the chair-
man of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association when 
asked last year: "A one-bedroom costs $450,000, and not too 
many young Chinese can afford it."27  
D.C.’s zoning regulations recognize the historic character 
and importance of Chinatown, with the language emphasizing 
an interest in protecting and preserving “Chinatown as Down-
town's only ethnic cultural area,” and preserving the “area's eco-
nomic viability by encouraging mixed use development, includ-
ing substantial housing, cultural and community facilities, of-
fices, retail and wholesale businesses, and hotels.”28   However, 
the focus of subsequent development projects has been on in-
creasing the economic viability of the district, with less empha-
sis on the importance of managing growth so that it does not 
result in the displacement of the resident community.  The pri-
mary discourse around development revolved around maintain-
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ing the diversity of buildings and the aesthetic “charm” of China-
town (with Asian-inspired architectural design and translated 
signs) without much emphasis on the people of Chinatown.29   In 
some ways, developers’ statements highlighting the historic na-
ture of D.C. Chinatown – that “preserving historic structures and 
neighborhoods is a physical reminder of our cultural history,” – 
can be deceptive.30   The historic nature of a neighborhood can 
detract attention from the current struggles to establish commu-
nity stakeholder control of development programs by suggesting 
that the community’s interest in an area is only historical in na-
ture.  Especially in D.C., the urge to “monumentalize” and rele-
gate events and traditions to the past, including community pres-
ence in a neighborhood, can lead to the dilution of present and 
future community control of the rapid changes in their neighbor-
hoods.   
Though there are many examples of neighborhoods that 
have been destroyed by unresponsive urban renewal programs, 
through a combination of public education, community organiz-
ing, and innovative legal strategies, diverse communities have 
found ways to work together to fight the tide of commercial gen-
trification, empowering themselves while advancing the cause of 
equitable development in their neighborhoods.  In rare occasions, 
the residents have also been able to use zoning and other regula-
tory designations to preserve the character of neighborhoods and 
enhance the prospect for community and equitable development.   
The Shaw area in D.C. provides a timely example of how 
development plans advanced by the District of Columbia could 
affect African-American residents and immigrant commercial 
populations, and how the responses of local communities may 
yet impact the future of the area.  
THE SHAW PLAN 
In D.C., various governmental agencies handle issues related 
to zoning, land use, and neighborhood development.31   Some of 
the zoning regulations and ordinances enacted and implemented 
by these agencies have been challenged for their discriminatory 
impact over the years.  For example, in 2003, a federal judge 
found that a D.C. ordinance classifying a permanent home for 
five homeless men as a social services facility that required ex-
tensive certifications discriminated against people with disabili-
ties.32   The settlement in this case included a stipulation that the 
officials of the Office of Zoning take a training course on fair 
housing.  In 2004, the United States Department of Justice set-
tled a lawsuit against the District of Columbia for discrimination 
on the basis of disability by imposing unlawful conditions on a 
building permit application submitted by Girls and Boys Town 
which sought to build housing for neglected and abused children 
near Capitol Hill.33  
Clearly, in D.C. and in municipalities around the country, 
residents and advocates must vigilantly monitor the impact of 
zoning ordinances and other land use regulations on all commu-
nities.  With low-income communities of color and immigrants, 
this need is even more urgent.  As local governments are given 
greater latitude in their definition of revitalization projects,34  it is 
important to take a closer look at cultural and historic preserva-
tion designations to assess their positive and negative effects on 
residents. 
Specifically, with respect to the Shaw area, D.C. has taken 
an ambitious stance on its revitalization.  The municipal govern-
ment has framed the revitalization as an effort to preserve the 
area as a “cultural destination district”35  to highlight its historic 
significance as a vital, central, and independent African-
American cultural community. 
In its draft planning document, “DUKE: Draft Development 
Framework for a Cultural Destination District within Washing-
ton, D.C.’s Greater Shaw/U Street,” the government presents 
information collected through a community planning process 
involving 500 community, business and institutional stake-
holders.36   The plan sets forth the range of development initia-
tives and uses to be undertaken in the Shaw area. 
The plan also emphasizes the importance of the neighbor-
hood as a symbol of the entrepreneurial, cultural, and economic 
independence of African Americans in the nation’s capital, and 
evokes the spirit of a community that struggled against racially 
restrictive covenants and segregation in public and private ser-
vices.  The plan focuses on the redevelopment of landmark 
buildings and underutilized public land, such as Howard Theater 
and Grimke School on Vermont Avenue.  Finally, the plan rec-
ognizes the work of community groups to garner recognition of 
the area as a National Register Historic District and push for fur-
ther development and rejuvenation of the district.37  
Once finalized, the plan will be submitted to the D.C. City 
Council, and upon approval by council members, the document 
will guide future decisions concerning the ongoing development 
in the district.  The process is expected to take between five to 
seven years from inception to conclusion.38  
The municipal plan’s emphasis on the district as a “cultural 
destination district” may have positive and also potentially nega-
tive results.  On one hand, a comprehensive approach that gives 
credence to local community interests in preserving the commer-
cial and residential character of the neighborhood could benefit 
many of the residents who have been in the area for a long time.  
For example, it could be beneficial to longtime residents if the 
city commits to preserving housing stock at affordable levels 
through mechanisms like inclusionary zoning, while integrating 
limited new development that increases the economic heteroge-
neity of the area.   
On the other hand, the plan suffers from a tendency to em-
phasize features like the African-American Heritage Trail over 
substantial development decisions that affect affordable housing 
and small businesses.  Widespread displacement may result if the 
city focuses on the “cultural destination” and economic revitali-
zation of the district without taking steps to address the eco-
nomic inequity between disadvantaged longtime residents and 
the more affluent residents who are moving into Shaw.  If long-
time residents are forced out of the area because the redevelop-
ment of Shaw courts wealthy tenants, owners, and businesses, 
the process could destroy the very character of the area that the 
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plan seems to promote.  If managed poorly, the area’s growth 
could replicate the result in D.C. Chinatown, where community-
based tourism and urban renewal have pushed the development 
of certain features of neighborhoods to make the districts more 
appealing to outsiders at the expense and distress of longtime 
residents.  Although the draft plan mentions affordable housing 
and emphasizes the preservation of the “community’s people as 
well as its housing and structures,” the extent to which the mu-
nicipal government and private developers can keep the best 
interests of the longtime residents at the forefront of the devel-
opment agenda is unknown.39    
Meanwhile, the demand for market value, high-density 
housing (such as condominiums) in Shaw continues to grow.  
The development of a number of large condominium projects in 
the neighborhood may indicate that the transformation of the 
Shaw area from a historically African-American neighborhood 
to a new destination for the young and affluent is already well 
under way. 
PEOPLE-BASED, EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT 
While the D.C. comprehensive plan for the Shaw area fo-
cuses primarily on commercial redevelopment and the renova-
tion of the physical streetscape through the lens of historical and 
cultural preservation, some of the community-based efforts tak-
ing place have focused on the residents and other stakeholders.  
Arguing that development should not emphasize place over peo-
ple, some community organizations have challenged the tradi-
tional community development model that better buildings and 
businesses will result in better opportunities for the longtime 
residents of a targeted district.40    
One such organization, Organizing Neighborhood Equity 
D.C. (“ONE DC”)41 , located in Shaw, has distinguished itself 
from traditional community development groups.  ONE DC 
focuses on equitable development and instead of identifying as a 
community development corporation, considers itself a non-
profit community organizing corporation.  ONE DC states that it 
is not interested solely in place-based development.  The organi-
zation emphasizes that simply creating new small businesses, 
new housing, and new jobs will not change things for the people 
who live in the community.42   While ONE DC is not opposed to 
all development, its mission to preserve and protect economic 
and racial equity may not easily comport with developers’ ten-
dency to rely on the market economy to resolve conflicting in-
terests resulting from the wealth disparity between longtime and 
new residents in the area.   
ONE DC’s Shaw Housing Initiative works, “to preserve and 
build housing that Shaw people can actually afford given the 
neighborhood’s lower average income, and that will remain af-
fordable for future generations…  [A]ll of this work requires 
building resident capacity to control and own a significant share 
of future development in Shaw.”43   By working with and ena-
bling community residents to identify and advocate their goals 
for the redevelopment, ONE DC is creating alternative develop-
ment options that value community control and preservation of 
the local community.  ONE DC’s Executive Director, Dominic 
Moulden, noted in a recent interview, “[T]he only way that 
things change for the people who live here is if the longtime 
residents shape the jobs policy, the economic policy, and the 
housing policy.  We’re concerned with community-controlled 
development, and community organizing is the tool that gets us 
there.”44    
To achieve its mission of economic and racial equity in 
Shaw, ONE DC employs a number of community organizing 
strategies to mobilize longtime Shaw residents.  First, ONE DC 
organizers conduct tenant-based organizing, during which they 
speak with residents in the Shaw neighborhood to get a sense of 
what the residents are seeing, and to incorporate the residents 
themselves into a broader community development context.  
Additionally, by reaching out to the disadvantaged renter com-
munity in Shaw, ONE DC organizers find tenants facing the 
conversion of their apartment building into condominiums.  In 
those instances, the organizers ensure that the tenants know 
about the “first right of purchase” law in D.C., which allows 
them the opportunity to pool their resources and buy the build-
ing before the landlord sells it to a third party.45    
The second strategy engages residents and members in 
popular education and direct training to familiarize them with 
the issues and empower them to take action through existing 
initiatives.  Popular education is used because it enables com-
munity residents to believe that they can collectively overcome 
the challenges ahead of them. 
Institutionally, ONE DC is working in collaboration with 
agencies like the National Capital Revitalization Corporation 
(“NCRC”), the District of Columbia’s Department of Housing 
and Community Development (“DHCD”), and other local stake-
holders to identify equitable development solutions.  One exam-
ple of such a partnership is a recent collaboration with 35 com-
munity stakeholders, including individuals, renters, home-
owners, churches, and non-profits to establish the Broadcast 
Center One development on Seventh and S Streets.46   The Cen-
ter represented a mixed-use project containing commercial, re-
tail, and residential space, with more than 200 new residential 
units, and underground parking.  The development was reported 
to be the first deal in the city in which the development process 
was resident-led and community-controlled.47   Together, they 
created a community-benefits agreement that will provide for 
jobs, housing, and retail opportunities for local residents in the 
development.  Three residents, an ANC Commissioner, and the 
government agency that controls the land signed the document. 
ONE DC is also working with the NCRC on two develop-
ments that will bring affordable housing and neighborhood-
based retail to the community.  One of these sites could be the 
first time in 40 years that truly affordable rental housing would 
be built on Seventh Street.48   The building may include up to 96 
units, and if the organizers are successful in bringing in a grant 
from DHCD, they plan to make the units extremely affordable, 
targeting the price for a one bedroom at $500 or less.49   Addi-
tionally, the organizers are hoping to support “super-local” 50 
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retail businesses on the ground level with rent subsidies for the 
first five years.  Though the principle of community control 
guides these and other projects, they are initiated and imple-
mented with the express goals of, “creating real jobs, creating 
real housing opportunities, and creating real business opportuni-
ties.”51   The future of Shaw depends on the ability of groups 
like ONE DC, working with community stakeholders and city 
agencies, to create innovative, responsive development projects 
that integrate community-control and identify opportunities to 
retain longtime residents  
THE ONGOING STRUGGLE OF                                      
DEVELOPMENT IN SHAW 
As community-organizing efforts continue, and the govern-
ment’s redevelopment plan is implemented, several factors are 
emerging which warrant special consideration when pondering 
the future of the Shaw/U Street Corridor.  Firstly, because the 
threat of displacement includes small local businesses in Shaw, 
the increasing numbers of African immigrants who are populat-
ing the Eastern U Street Shaw area with restaurants and small 
businesses must be consulted as stakeholders with an interest in 
the area’s future.52  In recent decades, the largest Ethiopian 
community outside of Ethiopia has settled in the D.C. area, and 
the Shaw district has become a cultural crossroads for that com-
munity.  Ethiopian immigrants have opened nearly two dozen 
restaurants, grocery stores, and other service-oriented busi-
nesses.53  While the size of the resident Ethiopian immigrant 
population in Washington is nominal compared to the local 
African-American population, the commercial nexus is impor-
tant enough to warrant a campaign for city recognition of the 
local “Little Ethiopia” designation for the strip of 9th Street 
between U and T Streets.54   There is still an opportunity for 
dialogue around common issues between the resident African-
American community and the Ethiopian business owners in the 
area. 
Secondly, even in Shaw, where community organizing has 
been strong since the neighborhood’s inception, longtime resi-
dents face the challenges of determined developers with deep 
pockets and an upcoming city mayoral election that could im-
pact the future of the area tremendously.  The current mayor 
will leave a legacy of economic development (including the 
D.C. Chinatown “renewal” and some of the first steps in Shaw) 
that is viewed in some circles as a vast improvement and a step 
in the right direction for D.C.  While this development has had 
a positive impact on some aspects of city life, it has also re-
sulted in the rocketing real estate market and escalating rent for 
longtime residents.  Before a new mayor is lured by the appeal 
of this growth, longtime residents must establish the importance 
of equitable development to preserve the character of these 
neighborhoods. 
The residents in the community must be given the opportu-
nity to stay in the area, so that they can preserve the historical 
and cultural aspects of Shaw.  If the redevelopment efforts, in-
cluding zoning and land use decisions, fail to provide a mean-
ingful opportunity for Shaw residents to stay in the community, 
it is likely that the historical and cultural character of the Shaw/
U Street corridor will change completely. 
Community-based initiatives continue to organize tenants 
whose landlords have announced their intention to sell their 
properties and cash in while the market is still active.  The goal 
of this organizing is to preserve the community by keeping 
longtime residents in the area.  Organizers can use a variety of 
tools – from legal responses to issue campaigns – to achieve 
these goals.  Moreover, local stakeholders must remember the 
lessons of Chinatown and other ethnic neighborhoods that lost 
their fundamental character due to urban renewal and develop-
ment projects. 
Meaningful partnerships with local organizations such as 
Shaw Main Streets, ONE DC, tenants associations and other 
groups will be important to ensure that the comprehensive plan 
for the development of Shaw is not removed from the local 
communities.  Additionally, increased opportunities for local 
longtime residents to actively inform and influence the ongoing 
planning and implementation could tip the scale in the favor of 
the resident community’s interests in the area. 
While a new heterogeneous generation of Washingtonians 
is now learning about and visiting the neighborhood regularly, 
it still remains to be seen whether this phase of mixed enjoy-
ment and use is only an intermediary and fleeting stage; a stage 
between the neighborhood’s historic past as a self-determined, 
independent hub of African-American culture and experience, 
and a possible future as a gentrified, affluent, and detached dis-
trict that is only a hollow monument to what it once was. 
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NARROWING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SENTENCING THROUGH A 
SYSTEM OF MANDATORY DOWNWARD DEPARTURES 
 
By Douglas Smith* 
I  met Allen in Danville, Virginia in the spring of 1993 when I was the Safety and Security Manager for the Danville Redevelopment and Housing Authority.  Allen was 16 and 
lived in a public housing development with his mother and sister.  
A model teenager in many respects and an anomaly among those 
I often encountered in public housing.   Allen was highly moti-
vated, attended school regularly, and had aspirations of attending 
college.  Most importantly, he avoided all of the pitfalls that 
doomed many of his friends: drug and alcohol use, premature 
parenthood, and contact with the criminal justice system. Then 
on October 16, 1994, after succumbing to peer pressure and in a 
semi-drunken haze, Allen participated in the armed robbery of a 
Pizza Hut.  The police caught up with him after the robbery at 
the local hospital, where he was being treated for a gunshot 
wound to his leg, which he sustained accidentally after abandon-
ing the robbery.1 He initially lied to the police about the circum-
stances of injury. However, the next day, he voluntarily admitted 
being involved in the robbery. After taking his statement, the 
police arrested and charged him with armed robbery and use of a 
firearm in the commission of a felony.   
Allen decided to plead guilty to the charges.  He had many 
mitigating factors in his favor including his regular high school 
attendance, his cooperation with the police in identifying his 
accomplices, the fact that no one was injured during the robbery, 
his clean adult record, and testimony received by the court from 
family members, one of his high school teachers, and myself.  
Yet, the judge sentenced Allen to 40 years for armed robbery 
with ten years suspended, and three years for the use of a firearm 
in the commission of a felony, all to be served consecutively.  
His sentence was nearly four and one half times the national av-
erage maximum state court sentence for robbery and virtually 
double the national average maximum state court sentence for 
murder.2  The only “positive” was that Allen was eligible for 
parole, having committed his offense less than two months be-
fore Virginia abolished parole. 
As of March 2, 2005, Allen had served ten years in prison, 
more than double the average time served by individuals with a 
prior felony record who committed robbery before Virginia’s 
abolition of parole,3 and nearly three years more than the average 
number of years served by those without a prior felony record 
who committed robbery after the abolition of parole.4   If Allen 
remained imprisoned until his mandatory release date of 2012, 
he will have served 17 years, a sentence virtually identical to the 
average post-abolition robbery sentence for those with the most 
serious felony records.5   
The shocking reality is that Allen’s sentence was well within 
the range of punishment available for his crimes.6 Most state 
courts hold that prison sentences within the legislatively pre-
scribed range of a valid statute do not constitute cruel and un-
usual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.7  Moreover, in 
Virginia, a sentence that does not exceed the maximum sentenc-
ing guidelines prescribed by statute is not reversible on grounds 
of abuse of discretion.8 Thus, the validity of Allen’s sentence 
seemed indisputable, albeit harsh for a first-time offender with 
such strong mitigating factors.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine 
the sentence Allen would have received if he had a prior felony 
record.  The court reporter’s notes suggest that the judge 
weighed societal intolerance of robbery, the need to protect vic-
tims, the fact that Allen was armed and masked, and the fact that 
shots were fired during the robbery in determining a sentence.  
While these are legitimate and reasonable concerns, news reports 
on arguably more heinous crimes9 coupled with my own obser-
vations of the racial dynamic in Danville, suggested that race 
may have affected the judge’s decision. 
Without assuming conscious or unconscious racial bias, this 
essay examines racial sentencing disparities between African-
American and White-American offenders at the state and federal 
levels,10 and advocates a legislative solution to ensure that miti-
gating factors are not arbitrarily disregarded by judges.  This 
proposal will address the U.S. Supreme Court’s assertion that         
“[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our 
criminal justice system.”11  Removing judicial discretion in 
downward departures may promote racial parity in criminal sen-
tencing.   
This article first provides a brief historical overview of racial 
sentencing disparities, discussing indeterminate and determinate 
sentencing.  It then briefly discusses the futility of pursuing a 
judicial solution, focusing on key decisions by the Supreme 
Court in Washington v. Davis, McCleskey v. Kemp, and United 
States v. Armstrong, and will analyze two radical and unrealistic 
proposals for reducing racial sentencing disparities.  The article 
then proposes mandatory downward departures, considering 
standardized offender characteristics and mitigating factors, in-
cluding the pros and cons of the proposal.  Finally, it concludes 
that society should use non-race based solutions such as manda-
tory downward departures in sentencing to create parity in sen-
tencing between White Americans and African Americans and 
restore confidence and fairness to the criminal justice system. 
RADICAL DISPARITIES                                       
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
As a historical matter, African Americans have routinely 
been singled out for harsher punishment than White Americans. 
During slavery, states enacted separate statutes known as “Slave 
Codes” to punish slaves who committed specified offenses.12 
Punishment under the Slave Codes for even minor transgressions 
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was often brutal and inhumane.13 Meanwhile, these same codes 
completely exonerated slave masters who killed slaves in the 
course of punishing them for “resisting.”14  
African Americans fared little better under the Black Codes 
of 1865, which controlled the movement and activities of newly 
freed slaves.15 The Black Codes penalized African Americans for 
“offenses” similar to those for which they faced punishment un-
der slavery.16 While the Black Codes were eventually struck 
down by Congress after the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments were passed,17 and African Americans gained certain 
rights and freedoms during Reconstruction, these victories were 
eventually whittled away by Jim Crow laws in the wake of 
Plessy v. Ferguson.18 Under Jim Crow laws, African Americans 
continued to face differential treatment and punishment under 
state laws.19  
Above and beyond Jim Crow laws, African-American of-
fenders were subject to the vagaries of indeterminate sentencing, 
a punishment philosophy which emerged during Reconstruction, 
eventually becoming the predominant method until the 1960s.20 
Under indeterminate sentencing schemes, punishment is indi-
vidually tailored to an offender’s unique situation or circum-
stances.  The trial judge has complete discretion to determine a 
sentence that falls within legislatively-
determined minimum and maximum 
terms applicable to each offense.21 The 
driving philosophical force of indeter-
minate sentencing is based on the the-
ory that crime is a “moral disease” and 
punishment’s goal is “reformation of 
criminals...not the infliction of vindic-
tive suffering.”22  The ultimate length 
of an offender’s sentence is determined 
by a parole board based on its view of 
whether or not the offender has been rehabilitated after a period 
of incarceration.23 
While indeterminate sentencing schemes enjoyed early sup-
port24 and appeared arguably beneficial to offenders in theory, 
history suggests that, in practice, due to their highly discretionary 
nature, African-American offenders were often victims of racial 
bias under such schemes. Indeed, as early as 1933, researchers 
noted “striking differences and wide disparity in sentence type 
and length” under indeterminate sentencing schemes and sug-
gested that “racial discrimination [manifested] itself in the form 
of more severe sentences for minority defendants than for 
equally situated white offenders.”25 The futility of addressing 
these disparities was increased by the fact that such sentences 
were generally not reviewable and judges were not required to 
explain their rationale.26 As parole was used to alleviate prison 
overcrowding rather than for rehabilitation,27 doubts about the ad 
hoc nature of parole board decisions, the potential for misleading 
victims, and high recidivism rates prompted concerns about dis-
crimination in the parole process.28  By the early 1970s, mount-
ing research suggested rehabilitation had failed,29 and growing 
concerns about sentencing disparities, prison overcrowding, and 
the perception that criminals were being coddled signaled the 
demise of indeterminate sentencing.30 
In the mid-1970s, as support for indeterminate sentencing 
declined, scholars and researchers advocated a less discretionary 
form of sentencing known as determinate or presumptive sen-
tencing, in which similarly situated offenders receive similar 
sentences.31 At the heart of the proposal was a mandate to create 
a set of guidelines to establish specified periods of incarceration 
for corresponding levels of seriousness.32 Judges would then 
have limited discretion to consider aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances which would raise or lower the presumptive sen-
tence respectively.33 Under the proposal, parole would be phased 
out.34  While early determinate sentencing proposals did not 
completely rule out rehabilitation as a goal, determinate sentenc-
ing has often been characterized as eschewing the rehabilitation 
of offenders in favor of pursuing retribution or “just desserts” as 
its main goal.35   
In 1984 Congress established the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion to develop sentencing guidelines similar to those originally 
proposed by advocates of reduced judicial discretion.36 The 
Commission was authorized to consider the relevance of “an 
offender’s age, education, vocational skills, mental and emo-
tional condition, physical condition 
(including drug dependence, previous 
employment record, family and com-
munity ties, role in the offense, crimi-
nal history, and dependence on crimi-
nal activity for a livelihood.”37  The 
final draft guidelines retained some 
original features but fell short in other 
respects in that these guidelines for 
criminal offense levels failed to ac-
count for the full panoply of potentially 
relevant offender characteristics originally suggested by Con-
gress in the enabling legislation.38 Also absent was a clear pur-
pose for the sanctions, despite the clear legislative history in 
which Congress sought to “require the judge to consider the four 
purposes of sentencing [rehabilitation, retribution, incapacitation, 
and restitution] before imposing a particular sentence.”39  
State reforms of earlier indeterminate sentencing schemes 
preceded federal reforms, albeit for many of the same reasons 
which drove federal reforms.40 Today, approximately 25  states 
have some form of either guideline-based sentencing, presump-
tive sentencing, or a hybrid of the two.41 Many states also estab-
lished mandatory minimum penalties for certain offenses that a 
judge was required to impose upon conviction.42 
However, the statistics gathered after most federal and state 
sentencing reforms were implemented are startling.43 A Bureau 
of Justice Statistics study on trends in discretionary and manda-
tory parole reported that, on average, African Americans remain 
incarcerated three months longer than White Americans in dis-
cretionary parole systems and seven months longer than White 
Americans in mandatory state parole systems. In studying the 
issue, several states invariably agreed that racial bias has at least 
His sentence was nearly four and 
one half times the national       
average for robbery and virtually 
double the national average 
maximum state court sentence for 
murder. 
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some influence on the decision-making process in state criminal 
justice systems.44 
Though much of the literature acknowledges the presence of 
at least some racial bias at all levels of the criminal justice sys-
tem,45 from arrest to incarceration, many other factors are cited 
for their “superior explanatory power” - in particular, African-
American patterns of offending and prior criminal records of 
African-American offenders.46  Furthermore, some scholars as-
sert that society need not be concerned about racial disparities in 
the criminal justice system if the system appears, for the most 
part, objective and unbiased.47  Despite these arguments, there 
are a number of valid reasons why racial sentencing disparities 
warrant concern, chief of which is that most researchers even 
those that conclude that legally relevant sentencing factors are 
the chief reason for racial sentencing disparities, refuse to dis-
miss the possibility that racial discrimination does play a role in 
sentencing.48  
WHY “POSSIBLE” SOLUTIONS ARE NOT     
“PROBABLE” SOLUTIONS 
Pursuing a constitutional remedy for racial sentencing dis-
parities, specifically an Equal Protection challenge, would be an 
exercise in futility because the court has typically upheld govern-
ment action with a racially disparate impact.49  McCleskey and 
Armstrong demonstrate that, notwithstanding clear evidence of 
racial bias, claims that reach the threshold for an equal protection 
violation based on disparate impacts are “available in theory, but 
unattainable in practice.”50 
Additionally, two methods pro-
posed to cope with racial sentencing 
disparities are affirmative action and 
racially-based jury nullification. Both 
remedies are targeted primarily at non-
violent drug offenders engaged in 
“victimless crimes,” which seek to 
ameliorate concerns about releasing 
violent minority offenders into the 
community and providing the same 
opportunities for community-based 
treatment, in lieu of incarceration, as are afforded White drug 
offenders.51  Butler justifies affirmative action using a modified 
version of the “diversity” rationale he calls “parity diversity,”52 
which presumes that disproportionate African-American crimi-
nality results from “the distorting influence of [W]hite suprem-
acy on the political and legal processes by which ‘criminals’ are 
named and selected for punishment”53  In order to combat this 
influence, the criminal justice system must artificially limit the 
number of non-violent African-American drug offenders that 
come within its purview, regardless of their guilt or innocence, 
to achieve the parity that would be had in a truly color-blind sys-
tem.  
Butler’s racially-based jury nullification thesis rests on a 
similar rationale.  To combat the influence of White supremacy 
in the criminal justice system, African-Americans may be mor-
ally obligated to engage in jury nullification (i.e.  the acquittal of 
some non-violent African-American drug offenders without re-
gard to their culpability).54 Butler seeks “subversion of American 
criminal justice” by using jury nullification by African Ameri-
cans “to cause retrial after retrial, until, finally, the United States 
‘retries’ its idea of justice.”55 
Butler’s arguments are persuasive but idealistic at best.56  
Even if the U.S. Supreme Court’s position changes on affirma-
tive action, Butler’s proposal would be limited if Justice O’Con-
nor’s proposed 25 year sunset on affirmative action prevails.57 
Butler attempts to skirt the substantive infirmities of his proposal 
by couching his requirement for proportionality of arrest and 
imprisonment of African Americans in terms that suggest 
“goals,” not quotas. Even if the proposal were to survive the 
political process, it would not likely survive strict scrutiny.58 
Butler’s racially-based jury nullification proposal suffers on two 
accounts.  The proposal is intentionally radical and subversive59 
and its implementation strategy might give prosecutors a suffi-
ciently race-neutral reason to use preemptory strikes against Af-
rican-American jurors.60  
THE CASE FOR MANDATORY DOWNWARD                 
DEPARTURES IN SENTENCING 
A standardized system of mandatory downward departures 
in sentencing synthesizes two seeming incompatible ideas - 
namely, reduced judicial discretion and the consideration of of-
fender characteristics and mitigating factors. Under this pro-
posal, relevant mitigating factors and offender characteristics 
would be numerically standardized for 
judicial consultation, based on their 
empirical relevance in explaining 
criminal behavior and how often they 
are cited by judges in downward depar-
tures from sentencing.61  Judges would 
consult the standardized form at sen-
tencing to assess the factors and charac-
teristics in a particular case. If the fac-
tors were present, the judge would be 
required to reduce the sentence, accord-
ing to the applicable sentencing guidelines, by the factors’ 
weight.  Judges would retain minimal discretion to depart further 
downward based on factors not enumerated in the form, but 
would be required to provide a written explanation for this de-
parture. Judges would be prevented from considering the race of 
the offender. 
This proposal would have several benefits. First, by defining 
mandatory factors for consideration and virtually eliminating 
judicial discretion, a mandatory downward departure system 
might significantly reduce the effect of racial bias at sentencing62 
and ease the concern that judges will “use departures to impose 
sentences according to their own ideals.”63  By the same token, 
using those mitigating factors most often cited by judges to jus-
tify downward departures ensures that a mandatory departure 
system reflects sentencing considerations judges deem most per-
“A mandatory downward         
departure system reflects a    
modest attempt to preserve     
certain elements of both           
determinate and indeterminate 
schemes in an objective        
package.” 
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tinent. 
Second, to the extent that the selected mitigating factors are 
disproportionately present in cases involving African-American 
offenders, mandatory departures based on these factors may 
close the racial disparity gap between African Americans and 
White Americans without relying on race. Downward departures 
as a means of closing this racial gap would be far less vulnerable 
to a constitutional challenge, would potentially reduce sentenc-
ing disparities with respect to other minorities, and could foster 
increased confidence in the criminal justice system among Afri-
can Americans.  
Third, a mandatory downward departure system comports 
well with the rough consensus among legislators and commenta-
tors that mitigating factors and offender characteristics should be 
considered at sentencing.64 Thus, the proposal would ensure the 
consistency which indeterminate sentencing schemes lack. 
Lastly, to the extent that sentences 
are ultimately reduced across the 
board, a mandatory downward de-
parture system might help to reduce 
prison overcrowding and correc-
tional costs, a growing concern in 
many states with determinate sen-
tencing.65 Moreover, the system con-
tinues to stress deterrence and inca-
pacitation as society’s preferred 
goals of punishment in order to 
equalize the system. Criminals are 
not “coddled” by this system, but 
merely treated as equally and fairly 
as possible. 
Objections to indeterminate sen-
tencing schemes recognize that the system’s discretionary nature 
invites the influence of racial bias at sentencing, invariably lead-
ing to disproportionately severe sentencing outcomes for African 
Americans.  By the same token, determinate sentencing schemes 
either do not give judges adequate leeway to individualize sen-
tences, or are voluntary in nature and therefore susceptible to the 
same infirmities found in indeterminate sentencing schemes. 
Inadequate consideration of mitigating factors and circumstances 
disproportionately impact African Americans.   
This proposal is vulnerable to several criticisms.  First, a 
mandatory downward departure system may only increase the 
influence of prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions, which 
greatly influences sentencing.66  Prosecutors may begin to 
“charge strategically to gain the upper hand in plea negotiations 
or introduce evidence of prior criminal activity or aggravating 
circumstances at trial.”67  Because of the courts’ extreme defer-
ence to prosecutors, resulting sentencing disparities would likely 
continue. However, this proposal presumes that sentencing re-
form will not occur in a vacuum. Concomitant reforms in other 
areas of the criminal justice system, like prosecutorial discretion, 
may help manage this problem.68   
Second, this proposal would be vulnerable to an equal pro-
tection challenge despite being race neutral.69 Since strict scru-
tiny is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact,”70 a race-neutral manda-
tory downward departure system ostensibly aimed at reducing 
racial sentencing disparities, particularly for African-American 
offenders, might be seen as presumptively invalid even if it si-
multaneously helps White Americans. Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court will tolerate remedies addressing the under-
representation of racial minorities which define in a race neutral 
manner “the disadvantages... that racial minorities disproportion-
ately face.”71  
A third objection might lie in the U.S. Supreme Court’s re-
cent decisions in Blakely v. Washington73 and United States v. 
Booker,74 which rendered both state and federal sentencing 
guideline essentially advisory. The concern of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in those cases, however, was the judicial enhancement of 
sentences above the maximum dictated by statute based on facts 
not decided by the jury,75 which violated 
the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.76 
A mandatory downward departure system 
presents the converse situation and, there-
fore, would not implicate the Sixth 
Amendment but instead pursues the per-
missible goal of sentencing parity.77 
      Perhaps the strongest objections to 
this proposal are the further reductions of 
judicial discretion and its low political 
viability. Determinate schemes have been 
criticized for being  rigid and difficult to 
apply.78 The Supreme Court clearly pre-
fers maintaining as much judicial sen-
tencing discretion as possible.79 Further-
more, this proposal appears to coddle 
criminals, particularly violent criminals, at a time when citizens 
are siding with politicians who adhere to tough crime policies.  
But most of the criticism has been directed towards the lack of 
judicial discretion to consider offender characteristics in order to 
adjust sentences downward. This proposal for mandatory down-
ward departures would squarely address that issue.  While ware-
housing criminals for long periods of time may help reduce 
crime to a minor extent in the short term, it hardly constitutes a 
long term solution.80 
A mandatory downward departure system reflects a modest 
attempt to preserve certain elements of both determinate and 
indeterminate sentencing schemes in an objective package. It is 
by no means a panacea for racial disparities in sentencing or for 
all of the ills afflicting the criminal justice system. Rather, it is 
an additional tool that can be used to achieve the ultimate goals 
of racial parity and fairness in sentencing.   Perhaps, if such a 
system had been in place in Virginia a decade ago, Allen would 
have received a fair and just sentence for his misdeeds; one that 
would have allowed him to return to society two years ago in-
stead of seven years from now.81 
“A Bureau of Justice Statistics 
study on trends in discretionary 
and mandatory parole reported 
that, on average, African     
Americans remain incarcerated 
three months longer than White 
Americans in discretionary and 
seven months longer than White 
Americans in mandatory state 
parole systems.” 
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THE INTERGRATION MYTH: AMERICA’S FAILURE TO PRODUCE 
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES 
 
By Samuel E. Brown* 
T he progeny of the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education1 have impacted high schools today in several important ways.  Currently, a high school education 
does little to significantly improve students’ chances for higher 
income and employment stability.  Preparing students for college 
is primarily a responsibility that falls on the shoulders of high 
school educators.  A college degree is becoming the standard 
threshold for identifying someone as “educated,” and therefore 
able to take advantage of expanding opportunities for upward 
mobility.  Creating a society that facilitates that preparation is 
the responsibility of that society’s government and citizens.  
When society fails to fulfill that responsibility, especially in the 
case of minority citizens, it is often difficult for those citizens to 
find redress through legislative representatives and bodies.  
Therefore, the judicial system can lend itself as the most effec-
tive governmental branch through which minorities can find re-
dress for their legitimate grievances.  
In the past, equal protection was understood to mean equal-
ity not only in natural, political and civil rights, but also in social 
rights.  However, after decades of failures caused by the aban-
donment of our social rights to the hands of private citizens, it is 
time Americans sought to activate equal protection to compel 
our government to secure these rights for all citizens.  In this 
way, a vital and fundamental right, such as the right to equal 
access, opportunities, and outcomes in education, will become a 
day-to-day reality that will replace the shallow, unsubstantiated 
façade of equality that exists today. 
This article examines how and why America has yet to ful-
fill the dream of Brown.  First, I examine the integration, or lack 
thereof, of America’s public schools and scrutinize the effective-
ness of past efforts to desegregate public schools after the Brown 
decision.  Second, I illustrate the effects of court cases, school 
tracking, and re-segregation of public schools by using African-
American high school students in Washington, D.C. (“D.C.”) as 
a specific case study.  Finally, I discuss whether equal protection 
should merely facilitate equal opportunity in education, or if it 
should go further in securing equality in educational outcomes as 
well.    
BEYOND BROWN: ALL DELIBERATE SPEED 
In deciding Brown, the Supreme Court refused to look back 
58 years to the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson.2   Instead, Brown 
considered the full development of public education and “its 
present place in American life throughout the nation.”3   Simi-
larly, it is not sufficient to compare the current state of education 
for African-American students to what it was in 1955.  Our 
analysis today should look to the relationships between educa-
tion and segregation, the development of segregation in America, 
and “its present place in American life.”4  
In Brown, Chief Justice Warren recognized that segregation 
with the sanction of law detrimentally deprived African-
American students of some of the benefits they would receive in 
an integrated setting.5   Following Brown, a U.S. Supreme Court 
order in Brown II mandated that schools desegregate with “all 
deliberate speed.”6   At present, the Brown ruling has failed to 
secure the right to attend integrated schools for African-
American students for longer than a cursory twenty to thirty year 
period.  This suggests that curing de jure or ostensibly state-
sanctioned segregation does not make desegregation a reality.  
Thus, perhaps one of the shortcomings of the U.S. Supreme 
Court order was the lack of foresight to ensure that once desegre-
gated, American schools would remain so. 
Additionally, after Brown, Americans became steeped in the 
belief that once public schools became racially integrated, dis-
parities in education might begin to disappear.  Fifty years later, 
high schools in urban areas are as segregated as ever and the 
educational disparities persist.  Phenomena such as “White 
flight” and the creation of small, one high school districts have 
resulted in the same pre-1955 segregation of students.  Notably, 
in the middle of the twentieth century, the courts were the most 
effective places for African Americans to find redress for their 
educational grievances.  However, because the courts were once 
effective does not necessarily mean they are the best tool to cure 
social and civil justice for African Americans today.  Yet still, it 
is crucial that the judicial system, with its history of curing social 
and civil injustices in upholding the Constitution, continues to 
serve as a foundation for securing equal protection.  
While African Americans have made great strides in 
“catching up” to White Americans, they still remain over-
represented in prisons,7  under-represented in the workforce,8  
and under-represented in higher education.  In 1955, African 
Americans faced blatant state-sanctioned discrimination in edu-
cation.  In 2005, African Americans face an entirely new mon-
ster: a subtle manifestation of discriminatory ideals cloaked un-
der a veil of seemingly equal access.  Some would argue the lat-
ter poses an even greater challenge to African Americans’ efforts 
to obtain meaningful, substantial educational opportunities than 
the former discrimination of 50 years earlier.  At best, “all delib-
erate speed” was an ambiguous phrase that has not brought Afri-
can Americans beyond the evils revealed by Brown, namely the 
equalization of educational opportunities for children of all 
races.   
BIRDS OF A FEATHER: DE JURE AND DE FACTO         
DISCRIMINATION 
The Brown ruling was in line with the original purpose of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  At its inception, the Fourteenth 
Amendment recognized that whether discrimination was state-
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sanctioned or the result of private actions and choices, the re-
sults on its victims were the same.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
sought to alleviate oppression and segregation not only from 
government, but from all sources both public and private, an 
ideal which the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases.9   However, Brown has largely failed because 
it does not address private as well as public-sanctioned discrimi-
nation, or in other words, the difference between de jure and de 
facto discrimination.  This is compounded by the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s failure to find that the Constitution requires schools to 
remedy de facto segregation.  Even the lower courts have split 
on whether the failure to remedy de facto segregation in schools 
constitutes a constitutional violation.  
For example, in Spencer v. Kugler,10  the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld a District Court ruling against African-American 
parents and students who were seeking a more racially-balanced 
school system.  The District Court 
adopted the longstanding notion that 
schools should only be required to 
continue desegregation efforts 
where de jure discrimination had 
been proven.  Justice Douglas’ dis-
sent recognized that the current 
situation of school segregation is not 
accidental or purely de facto.  He 
further asserted that the distinction 
between de facto and de jure segre-
gation “is not as clear-cut as it ap-
pears.”11   Four years later, in Wash-
ington v. Davis,12  the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that a law is not uncon-
stitutional solely because it has a 
racially disproportionate impact 
regardless of whether it reflects a 
racially discriminatory purpose.  The fact that there are both 
predominantly African-American and predominantly White-
American schools in a community does not itself indicate a con-
stitutional violation.  
This line of thinking continued into the 1980s, as shown in 
Crawford v. Board of Education.13   After a California state 
court ordered busing of students to remedy segregation in Los 
Angeles, California voters adopted a state constitutional amend-
ment that limited any State court-ordered busing for desegrega-
tion purposes that went above and beyond what the federal Con-
stitution required.  The U.S. Supreme Court held that the amend-
ment did not employ a racial classification, had no discrimina-
tory purpose, and the Fourteenth Amendment did not preclude a 
state from amending prior measures that went beyond the re-
quirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In his dissent, Jus-
tice Marshall recognized the fundamental fact that a state consti-
tutional amendment should not override federal constitutional 
guarantees; if it did, it would effectively deprive California’s 
minority children of their federal right to equal protection. 14 
Unfortunately, the pattern of re-segregation that began in 
the early 1980s continued throughout the 1990s.  In Board of 
Education v. Dowell,15  the U.S. Supreme Court authorized a 
return to segregated neighborhood schools.  In 1972, the District 
Court entered a desegregation decree against the school district, 
finding that it had not eliminated de jure segregation.  By 1977, 
the school district had achieved “unitary” status, meaning it had 
desegregated its schools but had not necessarily satisfied the 
1972 decree.  Eight years later in 1985, the school district 
adopted a “student reassignment plan” (“SRP”), whereby previ-
ously desegregated schools would return their student bodies to 
primarily one-race status.  The U.S. Supreme Court held that 
desegregation decrees were not intended to operate in perpetu-
ity.  The U.S. Supreme Court also proposed a test: in determin-
ing when to dissolve such a decree, courts should consider 
whether the school district has met the terms of the decree in 
good faith and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had 
been eradicated to the greatest extent 
possible.  Apparently, the majority felt 
13 years of desegregation was sufficient 
to eliminate the vestiges of centuries of 
segregated education. 
     In Dowell, Justice Marshall dissented 
again, this time joined by Justices Black-
mun and Stevens.  Marshall pointed out 
that the SRP superimposed attendance 
zones over some residentially segregated 
areas, resulting in a racial imbalance in 
over half of the district’s schools where 
student bodies were either more than 
90% African-American, or 90% non-
African-American.  Marshall rejected 
the majority’s suggestion that the 
Court’s decision would differ if residen-
tial segregation resulted from private 
decision-making.  Marshall believed that the District Court’s 
conclusion that the school district’s racial identity was due to 
personal preference did not sufficiently hold state and local offi-
cials or the school board accountable.  He asserted that the deci-
sion failed to address the unique role the school board plays in 
creating “all-Negro” schools.  Marshall also stated that the exis-
tence of personal preferences does not mean a school district is 
no longer accountable for helping to create such preferences or 
absolves the district from its obligation to desegregate schools as 
much as possible.  In his mind, the mandate from Brown im-
posed an affirmative duty on school districts to eliminate any 
conditions that furthered ideas of racial inferiority underlying 
state-sponsored segregation.  
Despite these stinging dissents, Justices Douglas and Mar-
shall never quite convinced the U.S. Supreme Court of the il-
logical distinction between de jure and de facto segregation 
when it came to the pragmatic application of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to educational segregation jurisprudence.  Still, 
their words ring true today.  Regardless of the source of segrega-
tion, the evils that the Brown decision sought to obviate are re-
“In the past, equal protection 
was understood to mean equality 
not only in natural, political, and 
civil rights, but also in social 
rights.  However, after decades of 
failures caused by the abandon-
ment of our social rights to the 
hands of private citizens, it is 
time Americans sought to acti-
vate equal protection to compel 
our government to secure these 
rights for all citizens.” 
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curring in force in today’s major metropolitan areas, often with 
the same effect on African-American school children - a sense of 
inferiority, unequal educational opportunities and facilities, and a 
serious dearth of racially diversified populations.  
RE-SEGREGATION ON A NATIONAL LEVEL 
A 2001 Harvard University Report entitled “Brown at 50: 
King’s Dream or Plessy’s Nightmare?” (“Harvard study”) exam-
ined the decade of re-segregation that followed the 1991 Dowell 
decision.16   Some of its major findings include: 
• A major increase in segregation in many districts where 
court-ordered desegregation ended in the past decade.  
The courts assumed that the forces that produced segre-
gation and inequality had been cured.  However, this 
[Harvard] report shows they have not.  
• Rural and small town districts are, on average, the na-
tion’s most integrated; large cities and suburbs of large 
metropolitan areas are the epicenter of segregation. 
• American public schools are now only 60% White 
American and nearly one-fourth of U.S. students are in 
states with a majority of non-White-American students.  
However, except in the South and Southwest, most 
White-American students have little contact with non-
White-American students.  
The Harvard study confirms that approximately 20 years of 
integration means absolutely nothing if schools are permitted to 
re-segregate in ways that result in unequal educational opportu-
nities.  However, some interesting arguments exist to counter the 
theory that this trend of resegregation is necessarily bad.  An-
thony Bradley of the Acton Institute highlights some of these 
arguments in his article countering the Harvard study.17    First, 
Bradley asserts that no ethnic minorities today are denied admis-
sion to schools in their districts on the basis of race because 
Brown successfully prohibits districts from using race to prevent 
children from attending schools in their own district.  In his 
view, the Harvard study incorrectly thinks it is wrong for schools 
to reflect racial composition of their respective communities.  
Second, Bradley wonders why community schools have to be 
integrated at all, criticizing the Harvard study’s lack of support 
for the conclusion that exposure to interracial settings has posi-
tive implications for minority academic achievement and White 
American socialization.  Third, he believes that minority teach-
ers, administrators, and parents should be insulted at the notion 
that increasing their children’s exposure to White-American chil-
dren and teachers will increase their academic performance.  
Bradley also identifies what he believes is the true evil in the 
equation – discrimination.  He claims if minority parents want 
their kids to be in better schools, they have two options: as tax-
payers, they can pick up and move to a good school district, or 
they can demand excellence in their own community’s schools.  
Bradley goes on to label the Harvard study as “overly simplistic 
and reductionistic” because Americans are no longer simply di-
vided by race.  He believes instead that the racial phenomenon of 
segregated residential areas is more closely tied to class and 
other related factors such as income level.  
I challenge Bradley’s contentions on several points.  First, 
the goal of the Brown decision and subsequent desegregation 
order was to eliminate the vestiges of racial discrimination.  
School districts have reshaped their boundaries to reflect segre-
gated residential patterns with the Supreme Court’s blessing.  
This is merely an indirect way of achieving what Brown sought 
to prevent districts from doing directly: segregating students on 
the basis of race.  Second, it is well-known that corporate Amer-
ica and most of our institutions of higher education have found 
time and again that diversity serves a valuable purpose for both 
White American socialization and minority integration into the 
upper echelons of academia and business.  If it works for these 
institutions and the adults they employ, then how and why is it 
somehow undesirable for our children?  Third, Bradley thinks 
that the true evil in this equation is not segregation but discrimi-
nation.  He believes that African-American parents, over-
represented in the lower-classes (especially in the metropolitan 
areas where segregation is most profound), should simply pack 
up and move to a better school district.  Yet, I wonder how many 
working single mothers, living paycheck-to-paycheck in the in-
ner city, Bradley actually knows, or if he realizes the tremendous 
difficulty in finding extra time, money, or energy to move?   
Furthermore, the reason the courts have been the last resort 
for achieving educational justice is precisely because African-
American political power has proven ineffective to create 
change.  Claiming that Americans are no longer divided by race 
but by class blatantly ignores the very real links between race 
and class.  African Americans find themselves on unemployment 
and in the military at a rate proportionately double that of their 
population.  Does this mean African Americans volunteer for 
military duty out of some overwhelming sense of civic duty, or is 
there just a serious lack of other viable opportunities for upward 
mobility?  Can we explain away the fact that half of America’s 
prison population is African American as a function of econom-
ics?  Bradley, and all of us, should keep in mind:18    
• As of 1997, the net worth of White-American families 
was eight times that of African Americans and 12 times 
that of Hispanics.  The median financial wealth of Afri-
can Americans (net worth less home equity) is $200 
while that of Hispanics is zero.19  
• African-American applicants were granted less than 1% 
of total home mortgages approved between 1930 and 
1960.20   Only in 1999 did home ownership among Afri-
can Americans recover ground lost since 1983.  
• In 1865, African Americans owned one half of 1% of 
the nation's net worth.  In 1990, their net worth totaled 
1%.21  
• On average, African-American students scored 144 
points less on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) than 
White-American students where the parents of both 
races earn over $70,000. 22  
Regardless, racism, discrimination, or segregation are still a 
very real and tangible phenomenon that adversely affects the 
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ways in which Americans interact in all of our major institutions 
- most importantly - in education.  
RE-SEGREGATION CASE STUDY: WASHINGTON, D.C. 
Although America is gradually becoming integrated in 
some areas, major metropolitan areas and schools still experi-
ence high levels of racial segregation.  D.C. is no exception.  
African Americans make up approximately 60% of D.C.’s total 
population, non-Hispanic White-Americans constitute 25%, and 
Hispanics are approximately 8%.23   Surprisingly, a recent study 
by the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee ranks D.C. twenty-
third in African-American White-American residential integra-
tion for the nation’s 50 largest cities.24   However, this residen-
tial integration does not lead to the kind of educational integra-
tion the Brown court anticipated in its desegregation order.  
Nearly half of all public high schools in D.C. are at least 95% 
African-American.25   D.C. public schools have a total African-
American population of 84.4%.26  
Certainly, the frequency of White-
American students attending private 
schools in D.C. might account for 
some of this disparity.  Still, it seems 
odd that only two schools in D.C. 
have a White-American student 
population over 20%, one only has 
12%, another two combine for 5%, 
and the rest have 1% or less.  So why are the schools not inte-
grated here as in other places?  Often, the execution of integra-
tion policies involves transporting African-American students to 
predominantly White-American schools, not the other way 
around.  This, in and of itself, is an entirely new form of dis-
crimination.   
However, it is important to keep in mind that D.C. is a spe-
cial case, since the ruling in Bolling v. Sharpe27  found D.C. 
school segregation violated Fifth Amendment due process rather 
than equal protection.  Still, the fundamental goal of racially 
integrated schools is the same: to provide equality in educational 
access to foster equality in educational outcomes.  One D.C. 
Circuit Court case, Hobson v. Hansen,28  is in line with this sen-
timent, but demonstrates a very different conclusion from the 
nationwide equal protection cases alluded to earlier.   
Hobson concerns the system of tracking that was introduced 
into the D.C. public school system (“DCPS”) in the 1960s to 
address the academic gaps between African-American and 
White-American students who were by then attending more inte-
grated schools.29   Under the tracking system, African-American 
and poor children were disproportionately assigned to the lower 
educational tracks.30   In 1967, a school segregation suit was 
brought against the Superintendent of DCPS, the D.C. Board of 
Education, and others, charging that the DCPS system violated 
Fifth Amendment due process for not fully complying with the 
principles announced in Bolling.  The D.C. Circuit Court found 
that the tracking system denied African-American schoolchil-
dren equal educational opportunities when compared to those 
provided to the more affluent White-American school children.  
The court ordered the abolition of the tracking system and 
barred any future tracking system that failed to bring the major-
ity of D.C. children into the mainstream of public education.   
Judge Skelly Wright’s opinion set out several reasons for 
the decision.  First, Judge Wright noted that the law is especially 
concerned for minority groups because the judicial branch is 
often the only hope for redressing grievances.  Wright recog-
nized that American society is based on White-American and 
middle-class values that, intentionally or not, create barriers ap-
parent in most aptitude tests for lower-class and African-
American children.  Second, Wright alluded to the fact that the 
vestiges of three hundred years of slavery and discrimination 
remain intact as psychological senses of inferiority, worthless-
ness, fear and despair tend to transmit from one generation to the 
next through a child’s parents.  While some would argue that 
this is a debilitating and almost racist attitude toward the state of 
African-American children, it is in fact 
a very realistic and pragmatic view of 
the effects of the vestiges of American 
racism.  I believe that this sort of view, 
at the very least, brings to light certain 
issues that most people would rather 
sweep under the rug and pretend do not 
exist.  Furthermore, Wright poignantly 
notes that “when the school is all 
[African American] or predominantly so, this simply reinforces 
the impressions implanted in the child's mind by his parents, for 
the school experience is then but a perpetuation of the segrega-
tion he has come to expect in life generally.”31   The goal, there-
fore, should not simply be to achieve numerically balanced ra-
cial ratios, but should go further to eliminate the vestiges of cen-
turies of educational discrimination in the true spirit of Brown 
and its progeny.  
CONCLUSION: EQUAL EDUCATION DOES NOT MEAN 
EQUAL OUTCOMES 
 The Brown Court voiced its doubt that any child could be 
reasonably expected to succeed without having the opportunity 
of education.  It further reasoned that this opportunity is a right 
that must be made available to all on equal terms.32   Could the 
U.S. Supreme Court have meant that equal opportunity did not 
encompass the fundamental concept that, beyond simply giving 
the appearance of fairness, equal opportunity should in someway 
affect and create real fairness in reality?  If so, that would seem 
to conflict with what the U.S. Supreme Court said nearly twenty 
years after Brown in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez33  when it announced that education was not a funda-
mental, constitutionally-protected right. 
Given the U.S. Supreme Court’s apparent split on the sub-
ject, the apprehension created by the idea to use the judicial 
branch to ensure equal opportunity and equal outcomes seems 
appropriate.  This is solidified by the mere fact that reliance on 
the judicial system as a means of repairing the disparity in out-
In 1865, African Americans 
owned half of 1% of the nation’s 
net worth.  In 1990, their net 
worth totaled 1%. 
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comes also seems misplaced.  Furthermore, there is a valid argu-
ment that judicial victories in achieving equal opportunity have 
been a false source of hope, leaving African Americans compla-
cent in the vital struggle for equal outcomes.  However, we must 
remember that as a consequence of our majority governance sys-
tem, the executive and legislative branches often do not operate 
in the best interests of minority groups.  
While I personally do not purport to have the solution, it is 
my hope that we will continually discuss and analyze these is-
sues.  That discussion should stem from the idea that equal pro-
tection without equal outcomes is adverse to the very purpose of 
providing equal protection.  Furthermore, equal protection 
should signify not only literal protection under the law, but 
equality of outcomes under state schemes that discriminate by 
subverting existing laws.  In the future, it is American schools 
that must strive for equal outcomes if we hope to fulfill the 
dream of Brown: equal educational opportunities facilitated by 
integrated schools, which will lead to a truly integrated society 
where the equality of educational outcomes is a reality.   
Admittedly, there is some truth to the argument that the fo-
cus on segregation, as opposed to discrimination, is the one of 
the greatest tricks ever played on America’s struggle for racial 
harmony.  The widespread acceptance of the idea that eliminat-
ing segregation will somehow cure our racial problems is detri-
mental to our society as a whole.  Although it is true that integra-
tion is an important step to creating exposure and facilitating  
racial interaction, the effects of racist discrimination will not 
cease to exist based solely on taking this step.  Instead, Ameri-
cans must take the next step and challenge the core discrimina-
tion that leads to disparate educational outcomes.  If education is 
the key to upward mobility in America, then the disparities in 
equal educational outcomes in the African-American commu-
nity, particularly for high school students, may be the snare that 
entraps a significant portion of its members into a perpetual cy-
cle of indifference, apathy, and poverty.  Not only do these dis-
parities eventually lead to disparate representation in higher edu-
cation, they also lead to disparities in the job market, home own-
ership, and a host of other indicators which, if nonexistent, may 
inevitably eradicate discriminatory beliefs.  As Americans begin 
to see actual equality in their colleges and jobs, the vestiges of 
discrimination will truly fall away and Brown’s goal will be 
achieved. 
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REPARATIONS CONFERENCE KEYNOTE SPEECH: 
SHOULD AMERICA PAY? 
 
Speech by Professor Raymond Winbush* 
I ’m going to let you know that I’m not an attorney, I’m a psychologist by trade.  And some of you may say, well why did you get involved with reparations if you’re a psycholo-
gist?  About twenty years ago, I heard a woman give a speech by 
the name of Audrey Moore.  She was more popularly called 
Queen Mother Moore.  You know, sometimes you can listen to 
one sentence in a speech and say “that’s it.”  She said that, “all of 
the struggles of African Americans in this country since 1690 
has been to repair the damage of enslavement and white suprem-
acy.”  Just that one sentence.  That’s why I thought about the 
civil rights movement -- Harriet Tubman, Sojourner Truth, and 
others -- and I said “that’s it.”  It was the issue of repairing.   
 So, Africans and Americans have talked about reparations 
since 1690 in some form or another.  We always talk about the 
modern reparations movement.  I always ask the question, well, 
when did it begin?  It began in the 17th century.  I discovered 
one of the earliest documents discussing whether America 
should pay.  In 1782, a woman by the name of Belinda, who was 
a former slave in the state of Massachusetts, asked her former 
master right after the revolutionary war for reparations because 
she had worked for him.  She asked for a pension of $15 a month 
for the rest of her life, because, as she says in her petition, she 
made him rich.  She worked for the Isaac Royal family, right 
outside of Boston.  Believe it or not, the Massachusetts state leg-
islature granted her a pension.  This is the first indication of 
reparations won by an African in this country in 1782.  There’s 
nothing new about the issue of reparations.  
 About three weeks ago, I got a call from, the International 
Lawyers Guild.  A group of Liberian workers with Firestone in 
California brought a lawsuit against their former employer, Fire-
stone, for slave-like conditions in Liberia.  They are currently 
living in California, and have fled the regime of Charles Taylor.  
Charles Taylor was arrested and will be tried for war crimes for 
preventing workers from suing Firestone, even though he knew 
of the slave-like conditions in gathering rubber throughout Libe-
ria.  This petition describes the conditions of the workers in Li-
beria, which is horrendous.  The children get up every morning 
at 4:00 and they have to tap the latex rubber out of the trees at 
the rate of 1,500 trees every day.  Their entire families and their 
whole lives are centered around gathering this rubber.  I remem-
ber when I was little, my father used to say, you should never 
buy Firestone tires.  I don’t know if it was for that reason, but I 
never did.  And now I never will because of what has happened 
with those workers.  The issue of reparations is global.  It in-
volves African people and other groups throughout the entire 
world, not only in this country. 
 In the past seven months, there have been two women in my 
life that have been the center of my life.  The first woman has the 
name of Katrina.  The storm Katrina that hit the Gulf Coast last 
summer is probably the single biggest social damage done to 
African Americans in this country since enslavement.  The Insti-
tute for Urban Research has stated that all of the survivors of 
Katrina are now scattered in 50 states.  The aftermath of Katrina 
should have removed all doubt from the minds of African 
Americans about how this nation looks at black folk.  I’m still 
amazed that there are some 3,000 children missing from Katrina 
and no one knows where they are. 
 The second woman is Oprah Winfrey.  I was in Barbados in 
late August of last year.  My cell phone rang and on the other 
side of the phone the person asked, “May I speak to Dr. Win-
bush?”  And I said, “This is he.”  The voice said, “This is Oprah 
Winfrey.”  I said, “Who is this?”  I thought it was one of my 
students at Morgan playing a joke, but it really was her.  And 
Oprah asked me if I had seen the movie Crash.  I said that I had.  
She asked me would I be on the show and you don’t say “no” to 
Oprah, so I agreed to do the show.  I became kind of the Dr. Phil 
of the show when it was first broadcast in September.  The criti-
cism I have of Crash is that it talked about individual racism.  
But it does not talk about institutional racism.  It’s almost like 
after you leave the film, you’re saying “everybody is racist.”  It 
really doesn’t do justice to the idea of what racism is all about, 
but go see Crash.  I know a lot of people have been using it as a 
springboard for discussion.  
 I believe three things about racism and White supremacy in 
the world.  First of all, the issue of racism is a global issue.  It is 
not confined to the nation of the United States.  It’s all over the 
world.  When I taught at Fisk University before coming to Mor-
gan, my assistant there was Naomi Tutu, the daughter of 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu.  I’ve had many privileges of talking 
to what we call, La Arch, about the global nature of racism.  The 
second thing about racism is that it is embedded in the very fab-
ric of the United States.  It’s a part of this nation.  In Derek 
Bell’s book, a law professor who resigned at Harvard, and is at 
NYU now, Faces at the Bottom of the Well, Bell says that there 
will never be a time in this country where there is no racism.  I 
don’t think in twenty or thirty years we’re going to say 
“remember when we had racism back in the early 21st century.”  
Racism is a part of who we are as a nation.  And a lot of times 
we’re in a state of denial about it.  I was very struck by the argu-
ments right after Katrina, because we always have this discus-
sion.  Well, they weren’t discriminated against or they weren’t 
left on the rooftops because they were black, they were left on 
the rooftops because they were poor.  So it’s a class issue rather 
than a race issue.  This country has always been in denial about 
that very issue.  Then the third point that I believe about racism 
is that it is very difficult to talk honestly about race in the United 
States.  If you lie about racism, you can become a Justice on the 
United States Supreme Court.  You can become National Secu-
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rity Advisor and be promoted to Secretary of State.  But if you 
tell the truth about racism, you could be in trouble.  Ask Martin 
Luther King, Fanny Lou Hamer, or Mother Rosa Parks.  
         I think what reparations does is afford us an opportunity to 
talk honestly about race in the country.  I heard it on the previous 
panel where someone said that this country has so many myths 
floating around about racism.  We have myths from “Lincoln 
freed the slaves” to “Sally Hemmings and Thomas Jefferson 
were in love with each other.”  I remember right before I moved 
to Baltimore, I was packing and saw this CBS mini-series about 
Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemmings, which they advertised as 
the greatest love story ever told.  Thomas Jefferson did not love 
Sally Hemmings.  He raped Sally Hemmings, systematically, 
beginning when she was only 15 years old.  If he had been alive 
today, he would be on trial for statutory rape.  So we have these 
myths, these American myths that govern how we look at every-
thing, including the issues of reparations.  If you listen to Lim-
baugh, he will say things like, well I’m not going to pay people 
any money for reparations, they just want a handout from the 
government.  But, the reality is that it’s not a handout from the 
government.  
         I’m going to read something from Warrior Method, some-
thing that took place in 1918 in this country.  How many of you 
know how many lynchings took place in the United States, 
roughly from 1865 up until 1994?  Tuskegee University kept 
track of them - an estimated 24,000.  I’m always fascinated by 
the pictures of the lynchings of White people looking at the 
black people as their bodies were being burned.  I want to read 
this one story, “The lynching of Mary Turner,” reported in The 
Crisis Magazine in 1918.  In the article, W.E. Dubois “confirms 
the inability of black men and black women to protect one other 
from violence.  After her husband had been lynched in Valdosta, 
Georgia, Turner made the mistake of making public her intention 
of seeing her husband’s murderers put to death.”  Now let me set 
this up, Mary Turner’s husband had been lynched in Valdosta, 
Georgia on a Tuesday in October of 1918.  The myth is that most 
black men were lynched because they had whistled at a White 
woman.  In fact most black men were lynched in the South for 
their land.  The boys, in fact, coined a phrase “White happy.”  
Mary Turner’s husband had been lynched for this reason on a 
Tuesday.  She asked her employer, a White woman, if she could 
have the next day off from work.  Her employer said no, that she 
had to come to work, clean the house, wash the dishes, take care 
of the children.  I can imagine, as Mary Turner walked to her 
employer’s house that she was angry, she was hurt, she was 
grieving, and she made the mistake of telling the White woman 
that she was going to see that her husband’s murderers were put 
to death, not knowing that the husband of her boss, was one of 
the men who lynched her husband.  “When word of her defiant 
promise reached those who had participated in her husband’s 
murder, they kidnapped her from her house.  Although she was 
eight months pregnant, she was hanged upside down from a tree 
and bathed with gasoline.  After burning her clothes from her 
body, her stomach was cut open and the infant fell to the ground.  
It gave out a whimper before a man crushed the baby’s head with 
his shoe.  When found, Ms. Turner’s body was riddled with hun-
dreds of bullets.  The autopsy report said 538.  Her murder was 
casually reported by the press as the result of her ‘unwise re-
marks concerning her husband’s death.’”  
 That was the lynching of Mary Turner.  Mary Turner wanted 
justice, she wanted reparations.  Reparations have nothing to do 
with a handout, no more so than if somebody breaks the window 
out of your car and you go to court and the person who broke the 
window says you just simply want a handout.  No, you just want 
justice, and Mary Turner wanted the same thing.   
 I want to read a letter that was written in 1865.  It’s in 
Should America Pay? and was written by a man by the name of 
Jordan Anderson.  He had been enslaved on the Anderson plan-
tation.  In 1865 his former master Colonel P.H. Anderson wrote 
Jordan who was living in Dayton, Ohio.  It said, “Jordan, would 
you come back to Big Spring, Tennessee and work on the planta-
tion again?”  Jordan was living with his wife and his children, 
and this is the actual letter that he wrote back to Colonel Ander-
son.  “To my old master Colonel P.H. Anderson, Big Spring, 
Tennessee.  Sir, I got your letter and was glad to find that you 
had not forgotten Jordan and that you wanted me to come back 
and live with you again, promising to do better for me than any-
body else can. I have often felt uneasy about you.”  The black 
folk called that a signifier.  He didn’t say I hate you, you make 
me sick, you must be crazy to think I’m coming back to Tennes-
see.  He said I have often felt uneasy about you.  “I thought the 
Yankees would have hung you long before this for harboring 
Rebs they found at your house.  I want to know particularly what 
the good chance is you propose to give me.  I am doing tolerably 
well here.  I get $25 a month with vittles and clothing.  I have a 
comfortable home for Mandy.  The folks here call her Mrs. 
Anderson.”  Now he’s signifying again because he knew that his 
former slave master would not call his wife Mrs. Anderson.  
“And the children Millie, Jane, and Gruden go to school and are 
learning well.  We are kindly treated here in Dayton.  As to my 
freedom, which you can say I can have, there is nothing to be 
gained on that score, as I got my free papers in 1864 from the 
Provost Marshal General of the Department of Nashville,” and in 
doing the research, I found out that was on the campus of Fisk 
University where I used to teach, which you know was founded 
in 1866 as a haven for the formerly enslaved Africans in this 
country.  “Mandy says she would be afraid to go back without 
some proof that you were disposed to treat us justly and kindly.”  
Black folk are always talking about justice, always talking about 
justice.  “And we have concluded to test your sincerity by asking 
you to send us our wages for the time we served you.  This will 
make us forget and forgive old scores, and rely on your justice 
and friendship in the future.  I served you faithfully for 32 years 
and Mandy, 20 years.  And $25.00 a month for me and $2.00 a 
week for Mandy, our earnings would amount to $11,680.”  
That’s reparations.  Notice the stages of reparations that John 
Van Dyke, a legal scholar, talks about it.  First, apology, tell us 
that you’re going to pay us, and then accountability.  A lot of 
times I’m disturbed in the reparations struggle when people say, 
“Well this ain’t about money.”  It is about money, and it’s about 
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scholarships, and it’s about justice.  “Add to this the interest for 
the time our wages have been kept back and deduct what you 
paid for our clothes and three doctors visits to me and pulling a 
tooth for Mandy, and the balance will show what we are in jus-
tice, entitled to.”  He’s used the word justice three times before 
the letter is even over.  “Please send the money by Adams Ex-
press.  In care of V. Winters Esquire, Dayton Ohio.  If you fail to 
pay us for our faithful labors in the past, we can have little faith 
in your promises in the future.”  Now see, this is one of the rea-
sons why I think there’s always been this tension between black 
folk in this country, because we know that this country has been 
a fickle lover to us at so many levels.  “We trust the good maker 
has opened your eyes to the wrongs which you and your fathers 
have done to me and my fathers in making us toil for you for 
generations without recompense.  Surely there will be a day of 
reckoning for those who defraud the labor of his hired,” quoted 
from the Bible.   “In answering this letter, please state if there 
will be any safety for my Millie and Jane who are now grown up 
and both good looking girls.”  The first sexual encounter of most 
White males on the plantation was with black women.  “You 
know how it was for poor Matilda and Catherine.  I would rather 
stay here and starve and die, if it come to that, than have my girls 
brought to shame by the violence and wickedness of their young 
masters.  You will also please state reparations if there has been 
any schools opened for the colored children in your neighbor-
hood.”  Now you know good and well that there were no schools 
for black children in Big Springs, Tennessee in 1865, but he 
asked, “The great desire of my life now is to give my children an 
education and have them form virtuous habits.  Say howdy to 
George Carter and thank him for taking the pistol from you when 
you were shooting at me.  From your old servant, Jordan Ander-
son.” 
 What was interesting about that letter, when I was doing 
research on Should America Pay?  I actually contacted the de-
scendents of Colonel Anderson, I couldn’t find Jordan’s descen-
dents, but I did find some of them were still living in Big 
Springs, Tennessee.  What’s amazing is that the current living 
relatives of Colonel Anderson are still angry at Jordan for not 
coming back or to say that he should have been faithful and 
come back to the plantation to help out because he knew that the 
plantation was in such disrepair because of the Civil War. 
 But the point I’m making is this that all of these wounds in 
South Hampton County, in Big Springs, Tennessee, and unfortu-
nately New Orleans are still open.  We have not done the repair 
in this country that is necessary to heal about racism.  As I grow 
older, I am very cynical about the fact of whether this country 
will ever resolve its issues of racism, because in this country, 
people do not want to speak the truth about it.  They’re in a state 
of denial about it, I think in order for reparations to begin we 
must all engage in the necessary dialogue. 
 
“Until lions have historians,            




*Raymond A. Winbush, Ph.D. studied psychology at Oak-
wood College in Huntsville, Alabama.    At the University of 
Chicago, Dr. Winbush earned his Masters and Ph.D. in psychol-
ogy in 1973 and 1976 respectively.  In 1976, Dr. Winbush took 
adjunct professorships at Oakwood College and Alabama A&M 
University in Huntsville.  In the fall of 1980, Dr. Winbush ac-
cepted a position as Associate Professor of Human Resource 
Development at Peabody College at Vanderbilt University.  
While at Vanderbilt, Dr. Winbush studied African-American 
culture and served as an adjunct professor in the Department of 
Psychology.  Dr. Winbush soon accepted the position as Assis-
tance Provost and Director of the Johnson Black Cultural Center 
at Vanderbilt.   
In 1995, Dr. Winbush left Vanderbilt to be named a Benja-
min Hooks Professor of Social Justice at Fisk University and 
Director of Fisk University’s Race Relations Institute.  In 1996, 
as part of his work as a consultant and web site curator of the 
Encyclopaedia Africana Project, Dr. Winbush traveled to Ghana 
for a research fellowship where he studied the last two years of 
Du Bois’ life in Accra, Ghana, and West Africa.   Upon his return 
to Fisk University in 1997, Dr. Winbush received a $2.6 million 
grant from the Kellogg Foundation to establish a “National Dia-
logue on Race” and promote regional conversations on about 
race relations.  Dr. Winbush organized and engaged in provoca-
tive dialogues focused on race relations with social and political 
figureheads such as Dr. John Hope Franklin, Chuck D, Max 
Roach, U.S. Rep. John Conyers, Erykah Badu, and Goodie Mob.    
In 2001, Dr. Winbush authored and published The Warrior 
Method: A Program for Rearing Healthy Black Boys, and in 
2003, Dr. Winbush edited and published Should America Pay? – 
The Raging Debate on Reparations.       
Dr. Winbush currently serves as the Director of the Institute 
for Urban Research at Morgan State University where his re-
search interests include infusing African-American studies into 
school curricula, African-American adolescent development, 
Black male and female relationships, and the influence of hip-
hop on contemporary American culture.  He is also working on a 
special project called the Institute for Reparations Information 
Strategies and Education with the mission of educating the 
American public on the issues of reparations.  Dr. Winbush sits 
on the executive board of the National Council for Black Studies 
(NCBS) and is the former president of the Southern Region of 
the Association of Black Cultures Center.   Radio and television 
guest appearances include the CBS Morning Show and Black 
Entertainment Television (BET).   
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s ociate Director of Princeton University’s African-American Studies program, Noliwe M. Rooks, details the history of African-American Studies programs in the 
United States and questions their future in White Money/Black 
Power.  Rooks divided her analysis into two sections.  The first 
section chronicles the programs’ turbulent beginnings on the 
campus of San Francisco State University and its initial support 
from the Ford Foundation.  In the remaining section, Rooks 
questions the survival of such programs amidst a variety of fac-
tors, including negative stereotypes and declining African-
American student enrollment.  The programs, which transitioned 
from the name “Black Studies” to “African-American Studies” in 
the 1990s, have become an integral part of African-American 
history within the academic community.  
The emphasis Rooks’ historical account places on the multi-
cultural group of students who sparked this movement is distinct.  
The images associated with the San Francisco State University 
protests in the late 1960s typically depict militant African-
American students pitted against armed police officers.  How-
ever, Rooks stresses that these efforts began as a multicultural 
endeavor among African Americans, Whites, American Indians, 
Asian Americans, and Latinos.  Together these students de-
manded the creation of a Black Studies Department and a sepa-
rate Ethnic Studies Department to meet the needs of “third-
world” students.   According to Rooks, between 1968 and 1971, 
these diverse groups of students committed themselves to create 
nearly 300 Black Studies Departments on college campuses 
throughout the country.    
As the title suggests, Rooks highlights the influence of the 
philanthropic efforts of the predominantly White institution, the 
Ford Foundation.  The fruits of the students’ endeavors were 
generally attributed to college administrators succumbing to the 
pressure of their demands.  In 1966, however, the Ford Founda-
tion’s new president McGeorge Bundy made it the foundation’s 
priority to address the country’s race problem by realizing his 
goal of racial inclusion in the United States.  The initial direction 
of Black Studies programs is credited to college administrators 
and African-American intellectuals.  However, the leading intel-
lectuals of the day could not agree on the curriculum or overall 
direction.  Many felt Black Studies programs should serve as a 
means of integrating African-American students into the univer-
sity settings, a recruitment tool, or even a form of segregating the 
students from their White peers.  Rooks recounts the 1968 Yale 
University conference where Mr. Bundy enthusiastically an-
nounced his curriculum plans for a degree in Black Studies pro-
grams, which became a guideline for programs across the coun-
try.  To Rooks, Mr. Bundy’s conference appearance signified the 
Ford Foundation’s dedication to the program, which would even-
tually donate nearly $20 million throughout the programs’ exis-
tence. 
Despite the strong emphasis placed on the Ford Foundation, 
Rooks does not give the highly revered organization a proper 
introduction.  She discusses the Ford Foundation without even a 
brief history of the charitable organization.  It is as if Rooks con-
tinues an earlier conversation with an acquaintance already fa-
miliar with the subject matter.  This noticeable oversight stands 
out when compared to the extensive background information 
Rooks provides about the events surrounding the programs’ in-
ception.  
In White Money/Black Power’s second section, Rooks evalu-
ates the current state of African American Studies programs on 
today’s college campuses.  She makes much of her analysis 
through her own personal experience as the creator and director 
of the African-American Studies program at University of Mis-
souri-Kansas City in 1995.  Along with accounts from other pro-
gram directors and scholars, Rooks suggests that today’s pro-
grams are shrouded by stereotypes and misunderstandings.  For 
instance, a variety of students question the viability of a degree 
in such a field, while college administrators only see the program 
as a recruitment tool for African-American students and faculty.  
Rooks states that such stereotypes led to the declining enrollment 
of African Americans in these programs in recent years.  These 
and several other factors lead Rooks to believe that these pro-
grams will struggle to re-define themselves for future college 
students.   
Although Rooks does an excellent job recounting the history 
of African-American Studies, her efforts become more convo-
luted when discussing the book’s second section regarding the 
programs’ future.  Rooks does not devote enough energy in ex-
ploring the future of African-American Studies, devoting only 
one fourth of her analysis to this element which makes the book 
culturally relevant today.  Despite the books brief analysis of the 
program’s future, Rooks recounts the programs’ history excep-
tionally.  By demonstrating the programs’ multicultural roots, 
Rooks contradicts the customary images of this era.  Her excel-
lent historical account provides readers with a solid foundation to 
help ensure the survival of African-American Studies programs 
of tomorrow. 
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H.R. 161 Healthy People, Healthy Choices Act of 2005 
(Millender-McDonald) 
 
This bill would let the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) create minority health programs. The bill cites 
the obesity epidemic and the staggering 61% of American adults 
who are considered to be overweight. Complicating this scenario 
is the lack of culturally sensitive healthcare which delves into 
the intricacies of cultural attitudes and ways of life, particularly 
toward eating. The result is exacerbated obesity and health prob-
lems for minority citizens. The bill also finds that many African-
American and Latino individuals are afforded less leisure-time 
physical activity than whites and so the health issues can be 
more endemic. 
The bill would let CDC conduct outreach and awareness 
programs to minority populations concerning: nutrition, fitness, 
dietary supplements, cooking, and other lifestyle issues. 
It would allow for grants to nonprofit health organizations 
serving minority populations. It would also allow grants to com-
munity organizations who facilitate healthy food products 
 
H.R. 663 Ex-Offenders Voting Rights Act of 2005 
(Rangel D-NY) 
 
This bill secures voting rights of certain qualified ex-
offenders who have served their sentences. It defines the right to 
vote as “the most basic constitutive act of citizenship and regain-
ing the right to vote reintegrates offenders into free society.” 
Congress has the ultimate say on federal elections and must en-
sure that state laws comply with the Constitution. Just under 
4,000,000 Americans are disenfranchised due to a felony con-
viction. This disenfranchisement severely affects minorities rela-
tive to the populace at large. Particularly, among African-
Americans, 13% of males are unable to vote. 
The crux of the law states that the right of an individual 
citizen of the United States, who has committed a criminal of-
fense, to vote for elections for federal office will not be abridged 
unless that citizen is currently in a correctional institution or is 









HCON 234 IH Whereas 8.2 percent of Whites, 11.8 percent 
of Asians, 22.5 percent of Latinos, and 24.4 percent of blacks 
lived in poverty in 2003, 
 
This bill reaffirms the obligation of the U.S. to improve the 
lives of the now estimate 37,162,000 Americans living in pov-
erty and also the 15.6 million Americans living in extreme pov-
erty.  The resolution cites particularly that surveys on food secu-
rity have revealed that those at greatest risk of being hungry or 
on the edge of hunger are households headed by blacks or Lati-
nos. It also recognizes that families with children are the largest 
growing section of the homeless population. 
 
S 2504 End Child Poverty Act 
(Kennedy D-MA) 
 
The bill aims to eliminate child poverty. It finds that 
13,000,000 children in the U.S. live below the poverty line. 
Most of these children’s parents are working and otherwise lead-
ing lives which should produce decent standards of living. This 
poverty among youth stifles their ability, in turn, to become pro-
ductive adults: often keeping them back in school and exposing 
them to myriad health risks such as lead poisoning. 
The bill also notes the rise in child poverty since 2000. 
Child poverty is much higher in the United States than in other 
developed nations. Particularly, nearly one third of Latino and 
African-American children live below the poverty line. 
Citing Prime Minister Blair’s public commitment to cut 
poverty by 50% in 10 years, the bill ends it completely by 2020. 
The initiative has successfully lifted 2,000,000 children out of 
poverty in Great Britain.  The bill sets a national goal of cutting 
child poverty in half within a decade, and eliminating it as soon 
as possible. It would also establish a Child Poverty Elimination 
Trust Fund as a measure to fund Federal programs to achieve 
that goal. 
The bill would also establish a Child Poverty Elimination 
Board which would have 12 voting appointees, 2 senators and 2 
representatives chosen in a bipartisan fashion, and other mem-
bers to be determined.  The board would meet regularly to build 
upon strategies at meeting the goal of reducing child poverty and 
also to oversee the Trust Fund. 
 
LEGISLATIVE UPDATES  
By Daniel Raposa* 
* Daniel Raposa is a second-year law student at American University Washington College of Law and staff writer for The Modern American.. 
 Along with all who were privileged to attend, I remember 
meeting Judge Woods at the very first conference back in 1997.  
He had not been back to the law school since his graduation in 
1960, which was regrettable for all concerned.  However, he 
graciously shared details of his journey through very challenging 
times from humble origins and ultimately to a seat on the bench 
in Prince Georges County, Maryland.  He also expressed his 
great pride in having graduated from the Washington College of 
Law.  When we heard later that year that Judge Woods had 
passed away, we were saddened that we would not be able to 
spend more time with him, but also gratified to have had that all-
too-brief opportunity to learn something of life from a wise man. 
As we celebrate the tenth conference, now so appropriately 
named in his honor, we reflect on the objective of the gathering: 
to examine the impact of law and its profound effects on African 
American life, work, and learning.  We hold in highest regard 
the many honorable men and women award winners and other 
participants alike who have deliberated with us each year.  We 
offer sincere thanks to the steadfast men and women of the 
Woods Conference Planning Committee for their great effort 
and care in implementing each of these gatherings.  We appreci-
ate anew the Woods family for their yearly presence, their 
warmth, and their generosity.  We contemplate the futures of the 
young lawyers whom this conference has touched as they step 
into their places in the profession, and we thank all those alumni 
who return to take part in the conference every spring. 
Thus, as we look back upon the last ten years and all that 
has made this conference an unqualified success, we hope–we 
believe–that we continue to honor the pride of place and accom-
plishment that its namesake–the Honorable Sylvania Webb 
Woods–conveyed to us in our brief and remarkable meeting of 
ten years ago.  We were, and are, no less proud to claim him as 
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